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CSCE

TANJUG reports that a CSCE session was held in Prague on 28 January to discuss finalizing a draft document on the situation in Yugoslavia, including a report on human rights. Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, and Liechtenstein attempted "to persuade" CSCE members that Yugoslavia "no longer exists"; that it is merely "a region in which new states appeared out of the former Yugoslavia." TANJUG claims that delegates "tried to erase Yugoslavia from the map of Europe." Head of the Yugoslav delegation Vladimir Pribicevic objected, saying that Yugoslavia can not be "annulled with the use of tricks."

Yugoslavia

Croatia—Talks were held between UN Under Secretary Marrack Goulding and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb on 28 January. Zagreb radio reports that both sides admit there are "differences in interpretation." Goulding stated that a "reasonably stable cease-fire, has now been fulfilled," but mentioned that "all those concerned" must be prepared to accept the UN plan and "cooperate" with UN personnel.

Bosnia-Hercegovina—Zagreb reports an increase in cease-fire violations in Neum municipality: "The enemy's special groups penetrated about 8 km into the territory" and "opened fire on the positions held by regular and reserve staff" of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Czechoslovakia

Federal Assembly deputies failed to pass President Vaclav Havel's constitutional amendment bill to strenghten presidential powers, Prague radio reports. Commenting on the decision, Havel said he "expected parliament not to pass his draft law," CSTK reports. However, Havel voiced concern that the possibility of dissolving parliament "must be defined in a new constitution." "A lack of emergency measures available if parliament is unable to function is dangerous for the country."

Poland

PAP reports that on 26 January Prime Minister Jan Olszewski announced that he plans to work out a "rescue plan for Poland's economy." The prime minister hopes that the new plan will appeal to most political parties. The demands of the hunger strikers will not be met by the government however, Olszewski stated, because "it is not a legitimate form of protest in a democratic state."

CSCE Session Attempts 'To Erase' Yugoslavia

LD2901031492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2332 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Prague, January 28 (TANJUG)—Today's session of the committee of ranking officials of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) tried to erase Yugoslavia from the map of Europe.

The representatives of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Liechtenstein tried to persuade the CSCE member-states that Yugoslavia no longer exists or that [it] was just "a region in which new states appeared out of the former Yugoslavia." However, the other delegations rejected their efforts.

The head of the Yugoslav delegation, Vladimir Pribicevic, intervened by saying that Yugoslavia, as a U.N. member-state, could not be annulled with the use of tricks.

The debate on Yugoslavia was opened as part of work on the final draft of a document to be adopted by the CSCE Ministerial Council in two days.

One chapter of the document is devoted to the situation in Yugoslavia and will contain an evaluation of the condition of human rights on the basis of reports submitted by a special CSCE observer mission.

The head of the Portuguese delegation proposed, on behalf of the European Community, that the document does not blame only one side for the situation in Yugoslavia, adding that neither side in the conflict could say that it was one hundred percent right.

Ahmeti, Hysi Make Statements on Public Order

AU2801163092 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Opening today's People's Assembly session, Presidency Chairman Dr. Kastriot Islami said that there would be a question and answer period today with statements by the prime minister and the minister of public order, following the demand made yesterday evening by the Socialist Party deputies and supported by the other two parliamentary groups.

Prime Minister Vilson Ahmeti said among other things that the government had always focused its attention on the maintenance of public order and the creation of normal conditions for the new elections, as well as on the proper distribution of food aid. The government has recognized the public order and security situation, and supported it by every necessary and possible measure. Local government authorities and local police forces are continuing to cooperate for this purpose.

The prime minister went on to talk about the concern aroused by the misuse of food aid during its distribution. He stressed that various associations have also been observed to have committed thefts, and it has therefore been decided that government vehicles will distribute aid and that aid will be stored in the state reserves.

In conclusion, Prime Minister Ahmeti said that the social problems arising before, during, and after the electoral campaign will call for support from the political parties in order to ensure that everything takes place in accordance with the law and to avoid any incident posing a threat to public order.

Public Order Minister Vladimir Hysi delivered a longer speech. He said that every effort is being made to stabilize the situation, emphasizing the fact that the police are now faced not only with long-standing chaos but new phenomena, too. The forces of the police, he emphasized, have new and inexperienced personnel, the majority of whom come from the countryside. He said that murders have increased by 55 percent, looting by 70 percent, and thefts by 30 percent, and that criminals possess firearms of all kinds. There have been thefts from the Army's armories. The number of road accidents has increased, and 251 people were killed last year. People are rightly asking what the police are doing. However, without underestimating our resources, the situation is very disorganized.

After talking about some measures that have been taken, he stressed once again that the situation has caught the Albanian police unprepared. He raised problems involving certain measures to be taken to support the forces of order, especially the police. He emphasized that the problem of the fight against crime and efforts to ensure calm during the electoral campaign are the main focus of the work of the police and the forces of order. However, they should receive more support from the parliament, the political parties, and the media. He then discussed the normal functioning of the justice organs and the need to establish a status for the police.

As for the problem of Tropoje, Mr. Hysi said that the police should have taken measures at an earlier stage, although in this case they had succeeded in preventing even greater problems. We will identify those responsible. Steps have been taken to submit documentation to the courts about the illegal assembly, its organizers, and those who carried weapons. He emphasized that there is a serious situation in this district, with thefts and murders.

After the recess, Prime Minister Ahmeti replied to many questions submitted by deputies in writing. They concerned the work of the Financial Police, the serious situation in schools and the aid for schools expected from the EEC, the storing of aid in warehouses, the measures to taken to stabilize the situation and to guarantee free and democratic elections, what the parliament can do to ensure the normal conduct of these elections, whether the Public Order Ministry is assisting the enforcement of the Land Law, etc.

Many questions were also asked of the public order minister, such as which districts have the highest crime rates, why the law is not being enforced while crime rises, whether the Public Order Ministry is aware of all the incidents occurring in different districts, what new laws the parliament should approve to establish order, whether the forces of order have been fully depoliticized, why no information is provided on the sentences of criminals although their capture is reported, why there is hesitation in creating new police stations, why foreign experts are not invited to assist our public order specialists with their experience, to what extent the people can be guaranteed a normal conduct of the elections, and many other questions.

The session will continue this afternoon with questions addressed by deputies to the minister of public order.

Democratic Party's Berisha Speaks in Vlore

AU2801142892 Tirana ATA in English 1033 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Tirana, January 28 (ATA)—On January 26, the chairman of the Albanian Democratic Party [DP], Dr. Prof. Sali Berisha had a meeting in Vlore city with its members and sympathizers, independent intellectual and other citizens.

Prof. Berisha underlined that over this century Vlore was successful during three occupations. In 1920 it was turned into a symbol of the Albanian resistance, fought with and won over an empire. In 1940 it shed the blood of the best sons and daughters for national freedom and the history will never forget this. In the nineties too, it was one of the cities of Albania that was liberated from communism and was turned into a powerful bastion of democracy. Therefore Vlore can be rightfully called not only a city of independence, but also of freedom.

After the liberation Vlore's intelligentsia did never reconcile with the communist regime. Hundreds of Vlore intellectuals sacrificed their life for the freedom of speech and thought. They will remain a source of inspiration on our way to freedom and democracy. We, Mr. Sali Berisha said further on, will win because the cause of democracy is a vital question for every honest Albanian. Today it has in its hand the destiny of not a party, but of the nation, it has to do with the destiny of Albania, our future, of our children. I am sure that the Albanian will not be mistaken for the second time, but will vote for the Albanian opposition, for our children. We will win this battle because the DP and the genuine democrats embarked upon this road towards freedom, not towards the titles and decorations. Hence the votes for democracy are the votes for the history of Albania.

Practically the Socialist Party, he said further on, is unable to run the country. With its own heritage it can guarantee to Albania neither its present nor its future. Tomorrow when the Democratic Party seizes power, it does not intend to appreciate the people proceeding from party documents, but it will appreciate them proceeding from two basic criteria: capability and the attitude towards the reforms. We do not intend to make the policy of cadre done by the PLA [Albanian Workers Party], for which the fundamental criteria was the relative connection with the Red nomenclature or political guarantees. For us the political guarantee of every Albanian will be his stand towards the reforms.

The eradication of communism is an indispensable condition for establishing democracy. But they both are not and cannot be the same thing. Tomorrow in democracy and full freedom the role of intellectual is many a times greater. I am fully confident that that intelligentsia, those working people, those people who brought these days, will build the democracy tomorrow, will build the democratic Albania.

In the end Mr. Sali Berisha answered the questions of those present regarding the stand of the Democratic Party towards Balli Kombetar [National Front] and other collaborators with the occupier, the martyrs' families, the aid of the Democratic Party for the countryside after elections, etc.

Likewise the leader of the Democratic Party met with peasants of Drashovice village and nearby zone. There Mr. Berisha spoke of the traditions of this zone in the Liberation War, the granting of land to the peasant, the next elections, etc.

Socialist Party Rally Prevented in Bajram Curri

AU2701183492 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1700 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] A declaration by the Human Rights Forum expresses concern at the incident that occurred in the town of Bajram Curri, in which groups of people forcibly prevented the normal conduct of a Socialist Party rally. Nothing can justify such behavior in the current situation in our country after the great change toward pluralism. Everybody, individually or in groups, has the total right and opportunity to express his views, wishes, opposition, criticism, or support in a democratic and peaceful way. It is everybody's duty to strictly respect the regulations concerning public assemblies and meetings prescribed by the law in accordance with international standards. We have conclusively turned our backs on dictatorship and have resolutely embraced the principles of the rule of law.

The Forum draws attention to the danger of a repetition of such incidents, which could further destabilize the situation in the country and seriously compromise the normal conduct of the electoral campaign and the destiny of democracy. The Forum calls on all political parties to clearly dissociate themselves from such incidents and to exert their influence on the masses of their members and supporters, encouraging them to steer clear of such irresponsible elements that are attempting to destroy public order on the threshold of the new historical chance that the forthcoming elections offer to Albanian democracy.

Slovene Economic Delegation Arrives, Holds Talks

AU2901101492 Tirana ATA in English 0926 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Tirana, January 29 (ATA)—On January 28, an economic delegation of the Republic of Slovenia, headed by the minister of communication and liason, Marjan Kranjc arrived in our country.

At the Rinas airport the delegation was welcomed by the Minister of Transports Ilir Mataj and other functionaries of this ministry and of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

On this occasion, talks were conducted between the delegations of both countries. Participating in the talks from the Albanian party were the minister of foreign economic relations, Ylli Cabiri, the minister of transports, Ilir Mataj and other functionaries of the two ministries and of the "Albtransport" enterprise. In course of the talks opinions were exchanged on the promotion of economic cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the field of transport. In this framework there were treated issues of establishing soon an airline between the two countries, of establishing a ferry-boat line between Durres sea-port and Koper-port, of the international motor-road transport etc.

On the same day the Slovene delegation was received at a separate meeting by the minister of finance, Robert Ceku.

Podkrepa Calls For Kostov, Pushkarov Resignations

Trenchev Says 'Nothing Personal'

AU2801194992 Sofia BTA in English 1911 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 28 (BTA)—"There is nothing personal in our demand for the resignations of Mr. Kostov (minister of finance) and Mr. Pushkarov (minister of industry and trade). This is a matter of principle and the reasons for it stem from the implementation of the economic reform. Some of the failures are due to the subjective factor. We are deeply concerned about this country and about the course it has taken," Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, president of the Podkrepa Labour Confederation, said at today's press conference.

Dr. Trenchev said that his trade union is not urging for the resignation of the government but for the resignations of Mr. Kostov and Mr. Pushkarov because, according to him, they are impeding the economic reform and are the main factors for the negative tendencies in the country's development. Asked about possible substitutes for the two ministers Dr. Trenchev said that they should be appointed by the government and not by Podkrepa.

Asked by BTA whether the demand for the resignation of Finance Minister Ivan Kostov is provoked by the latter's firm position on the miners' strike organized by Podkrepa last August, Dr. Trenchev said that the demand has been raised after an objective analysis and has nothing to do with the miners' strike.

On January 24 Dr. Trenchev met with the president and the premier and demanded the resignations of Mr. Kostov and Mr. Pushkarov. Today Dr. Trenchev denied any knowledge of the president's position on this issue.

Mr. Dimov, head of the Miners' Trade Union with Podkrepa, said that on January 24 the Trade Union's leadership decided to start arrangements for a new strike. Dr. Trenchev said that he is not against strikes in individual branches.

PODKREPA Article Explains Demand

AU2901130192 Sofia BTA in English 1057 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 29 (BTA)—Today's "PODKREPA" runs an article by Asen Michkovski and Valentin Karabashev headlined "Reform Has No Alternative—Resignation for Two Instead of Resignation for All," explaining the reason why the Podkrepa Labour Confederation is urging for the resignations of Mr. Ivan Kostov, minister of finance, and Mr. Ivan Pushkarov, minister of industry and trade. "The two ministers launched the economic reform in Bulgaria and the transition from a centrally planned to a market-driven economy. However, they lacked a clear conception and a consistent programme complying with the specific characteristics of the social and economic situation in the country," it is said in the article.

The government's economic team failed to offer a strategy for solving the key issue of privatization or to avail itself of the possibility of becoming the driving force of the new economic legislation by using its right to legislative initiative and create a favourable climate for a genuine structural adjustment of the country's economy.

According to the authors, serious mistakes have been made. The demonopolization and decentralization of the majority of state enterprises was carried out without a detailed analysis of their technological, technical and financial state, a type of covert privatization has started enabling the merging of state and private capital. This resulted in growing social tensions and deepened the conflict between the government, the economic executives and the trade unions. At the same time much of the economic power was concentrated in one ministry only which runs counter to the principles of market economy. Parliament has not yet adopted a budget for 1992, there are no laws on taxation, social security, on the separation of municipal budgets from the national budget and no support has been provided for the private sector, the article reads.

The fact that the Podkrepa Labour Confederation draws public attention to the failures in the implementation of the economic reform before the economic situation gets worse is a proof of the principled position of the trade union, Mr. Michkovski and Mr. Karabashev write.

SDS Pledges Support to Government

AU2801201392 Sofia BTA in English 1957 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Sofia, January 28 (BTA)—The Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and its parliamentary faction once again pledged their support for the government. The demands of the leaders of the two big trade unions (the Podkrepa Labour Confederation and the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions) for the resignations of Mr. Ivan Kostov, minister of finance, and Mr. Ivan Pushkarov, minister of industry and trade, will not be satisfied.

The SDS parliamentary faction, Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov and cabinet members discussed the problem of confidence in the government. According to Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov, SDS floor leader, all SDS MP's [members of parliament] except one voted confidence in the government.

"At the same time we hope that this government will start functioning more effectively and energetically after the adoption of acts on restitution and privatization. We also hope that it will show greater resolve in the struggle against the economic nomenklatura," Mr. Yordanov told the press. Dr. Konstantin Trenchev, president of the Podkrepa Confederation, motivated his demand for the

resignations of Mr. Kostov and Mr. Pushkarov with the fact that they have failed in the structural adjustment of the Bulgarian economy. According to sources close to the SDS, Dr. Trenchev's demands are supported by President Zhelev.

In a statement today Mrs. Nadezhda Mikhaylova, spokeswoman for the government, did not deny that Dr. Trenchev had earlier acquainted Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov with his demands. However, she said "there should not be any haggling over matters which are beyond the competence of the trade unions." She made it clear that the cabinet had not discussed any changes.

According to Mr. Yordanov, the SDS parliamentary group has insisted that the government make certain structural changes in the cabinet. He declined to provide any details but hinted that they may affect some of the cabinet members.

Pushkarov Makes Official Statement

AU2801142492 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] In connection with the demand of Dr. Trenchev and the Executive Council of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation that minister [of industry and trade] Pushkarov resign, our trade union correspondent Petur Donchev asked the minister to respond.

The minister, who is not very talkative, said the following: The Council of Ministers will have the last word. However, I will not agree to be used as a pretext for splitting the Union of Democratic Forces. I reserve my right to make an official statement. I would only like to say in conclusion that generally, in recent years I have had no luck with doctors. Precisely one year ago I had problems with another doctor....

Minister Pushkarov probably means Dr. Dertliev, our correspondent assumes.

However, Minister Pushkarov continued, I am deeply convinced that what we are doing is the only possible manner of implementing the reform. No one could convince me otherwise.

Agrarian Leader Drenchev Comments on Elections

AU2801093292 Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 21 Jan 92 p 1

[Report on interview with Milan Drenchev, chief secretary of the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "We Saw Ourselves"]

[Text] We have a democratically elected president. We elected him through direct elections. Subsequently, I want to remind you of my position at the time of the discussions on the Constitution when we were debating the section on the election of the president. Until this point in the discussions I had propounded the theory of direct general elections. Consequently, from my observations, I received the impression that the first election of a president must be carried out by the deputies in the National Assembly. The current elections proved me right. People have still not assimilated the strength of democracy and this makes them uncertain—they find it difficult to sort out their preferences; they find it difficult to assess the candidates' qualities. I will not hide my fears: If the leader of the team that lost in the run-off had not been Velko Vulkanov but somebody else, then Zhelyu Zhelev's victory would have been more problematic.

Democracy won. I believe that our people themselves were also the victors. At the next presidential elections the people will be able, I am certain, to correctly choose the president and his vice president through direct voting. For me, the elections and their results are a testimony to the painful maturing of our people as a whole in the democratic processes. From this point of view one may predict that the future will unrelentingly demand a strong social foundation for the democratic idea. During these elections, at certain stages, the idea became cut off from the support of those who had professed it. The Agrarian Union is one of the keystones of democratization in our society. Whenever the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union has come under attack or been underestimated, democracy has always been in danger. These elections confirmed this historical truth.

Parliament Rejects Havel Presidential Powers Bill

LD2801151692 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Report by Jan Kulhavy from the Federal Assembly]

[Text] Deputies postponed until this afternoon a vote on the president's bill on the amendment of the constitutional law which would strengthen the powers of the head of our state and allow him to dissolve the Federal Assembly—better to say a vote on a proposal of the resolution drafted by the constitutional and legal committees which does not preserve too much of the president's original bill. In fact, only one possibility would be given to the head of our state—to dissolve parliament only if one of its chambers were permanently unable to function during the entire period of a joint session.

Nevertheless, it was a failure—neither a bill put forward by the constitutional and legal committees nor the president's original bill passed.

The president's bill was not accepted by either of the chambers. As far as the constitutional and legal committees' bill is concerned, it failed to gain a majority in the Slovak part of the Chamber of Nations, to nobody's surprise. Thus, this is already the third constitutional bill not to have been passed by this chamber during the 20th joint session.

What are then the chances of two bills—those submitted by the president and by the deputies—on amending the election law? The chambers have just begun to discuss them.

Havel Says Rejection 'Expected'

LD2801234492 Prague CSTK in English 2003 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Prague Jan 28 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel today said he had expected parliament not to pass his draft law outlining circumstances under which the president can dissolve parliament. The draft law, rejected by the Czechoslovak parliament today, is the third of five legislative initiatives put forward by Havel which parliament has failed to approve. A week ago parliament did not pass a bill on the procedure to adopt a new constitution and a draft amendment to the law on a referendum.

Havel told CSTK that ways of dissolving parliament must be defined in a new constitution. He said a lack of emergency measures available if parliament is unable to function is dangerous for the country.

Dubcek Assesses Current Federal Assembly Session

AU2801161992 Prague CSTK in English 1905 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Text] Bratislava Jan 26 (CSTK)—When assessing the course of the 20th session of the Czechoslovak parliament this week, its Chairman Alexander Dubcek said he is not so optimistic [as] he was a week ago, but while there's life there's hope. In an interview for CSTK, Dubcek said he cannot rule out the possibility the parliament will adopt a law on its new structure, and that the June 1992 elections will be held to this parliament whose setup has just been approved. The new parliament will then arrange its relation to a new government and head of state.

Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel has withdrawn from the agenda of the 20th parliament session his draft law on a new setup of the federal parliament which called for creating a single-chamber parliament with 200 deputies and a 30-member federal council. Deputies' bill favors a bicameral parliament consisting of a 200-strong chamber of deputies and a senate of 100.

When asked whether a catastrophic scenario for a constitutional crisis is still a reality, Dubcek said "no". According to him, there will be no one to dissolve either the parliament or the government.

Human Rights Report Presented to Federal Assembly

LD2601201492 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1300 GMT 24 Jan 92

[Text] The agenda for this afternoon's session of today's Federal Assembly deliberations is a report on the adherence to human rights in the CSFR.

The first part was delivered by Deputy Federal Prime Minister Jozef Miklosko. In his address he mentioned several chapters of the report. The first chapter deals with administration of nationality and ethnic minorities. The constitutional law, valid until recently, dating back to 1968, through its taxative enumeration of national minorities living in Czechoslovakia, limited to a considerable extent the free will of the citizens and was effective also as an instrument of purposeful discrimination. For example, the Ruthenian nationality was listed only as an alternative to Ukrainian nationality. The Romany nationality did not officially exist. Only by adopting a constitutional paper of fundamental rights and freedoms last year, were realistic condititions for the development of the actual cultural and nationality identity of minorities were created.

As to racial intolerance and antisemitism, Jozef Miklosko recalled the resolution of the Federal Assembly of the 7 November last year through which deputies condemn such statements. The most serious problems, in this connection, are attacks by skinheads against the Romany population. In order to excuse their actions, one brings in arguments of the so-called Romany criminality. Concentration, analysis, and interpretation of Romany criminality as a special category, at the same time, is illegal and in the sense of the aforementioned constitutional letter, [words indistinct] contains pronounced elements of racial discrimination.

Jozef Miklosko, also sees manifestations of racial discrimination in the relation of our population toward refugees and to the Vietnamese working in our country.

One has to add that reports have also been submitted in writing by the federal minister of the interior and the prosecutor general of the CSFR.

Carnogursky Outlines Views on Slovak Constitution

AU2701192392 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Jan 92 pp 1, 13

[Interview with Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, by Alena Melicharkova in Bratislava; date not given: "Will a Referendum Decide on the Constitution?"]

[Text] The public debate on the draft constitution of the Slovak Republic is slowly coming to an end. It cannot be said that it has been lively and passionate. It is conceivable that the finishing spurt (the debate is to end next week) will change something about this. Nevertheless, what some Slovak National Council deputies had expected of this debate is unlikely to come true. The argument can be heard from various sides that the citizens' lack of interest has been caused primarily by the draft not being clearly arranged, containing alternative versions. We addressed Jan Carnogursky, not only in his capacity as prime minister of the Slovak Republic and chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], but also as a legal expert.

[Melicharkova] How do you view the draft of the constitution from those three perspectives, and what is your opinion on the concoction [elaborat] submitted by deputies?

[Carnogursky] The draft reflects the fact, both legally and politically, that it is the product of talks among several political parties having divergent views on the shape of the future Slovak constitution. Ultimately, this is reflected in the alternative versions of some provisions and also in the draft's language, which at times is not legally pure.

[Melicharkova] The draft was submitted to the public for debate. Citizens are expected to deliver their opinion on it. In your opinion, is the orientation in the text and its comprehensibility sufficient for them to do so?

[Carnogursky] We have to realize that even a complete, single- version constitution, one that has already been passed, is not fully comprehensible to a wide range of citizens. The submitted draft of the Slovak constitution is probably the only one on which the 10 political parties [represented in the Slovak National Council] were able to agree.

[Melicharkova] Let us take a closer look at the contents of the draft. It exists in four alternative versions. Which of them would be the most acceptable one from the viewpoint of international law?

[Carnogursky] The KDH Council adopted a resolution in which it recommends the so-called presidential version, which means that, on the one hand, the Slovak constitution would include all the powers of the state, and, on the other, it would make possible the coexistence of Czechs and Slovaks in a common state. The aforementioned version provides for Slovak bodies' jurisdiction over everything, while at the same time making it possible to delegate some of these powers to the common state by means of a treaty.

In the event of the breakup of the common state, provisions for which are included in both the draft of the constitution and in the referendum law, the ceded powers would return to the Slovak Republic.

[Melicharkova] In other words, is it to be expected that in the Slovak parliament the KDH will push for the version of the Slovak Republic constitution that provides for a president?

[Carnogursky] Yes.

[Melicharkova] When do you expect the Slovak Republic constitution to be passed, and on what does it depend?

[Carnogursky] Once the public debate ends, the comments and suggestions it has yielded are to be processed by the legislative department of the Slovak National Council. Thus processed, the constitution draft will be discussed by Slovak National Council committees, which will decide on the further course of action. The KDH Council has recommended that, after the incorporation of comments and after the consideration of the constitution draft in the Slovak National Council, the Slovak National Council submit the constitution draft to the citizens of the Slovak Republic for approval in a referendum. I am not able to foretell whether this recommendation will be universally accepted, but a referendum would endow the Slovak Republic Constitution with great legitimacy.

[Melicharkova] Is it the case that your idea is to hold this referendum concurrently with the elections?

[Carnogursky] That would be very economical organizationally. To tell the truth, I am not sure that we will be able to prepare the referendum in such a way [that it can be held concurrently with the June 1992 elections] and that the Slovak National Council will agree on a single version of the constitution. It would be impossible to submit several versions to a referendum, as we did in submitting the draft constitution to a public debate.

[Melicharkova] Regarding the Slovak Republic constitution and with the intended treaty between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the question arises as to whether the two sides will manage to conclude the treaty prior to the elections or whether the treaty will have to wait until the Slovak Republic constitution is passed?

[Carnogursky] We are doing everything we can so that the treaty will be adopted prior to the elections.

RESPEKT Investigates Continuing Arms Trade

LD2801111792 Prague Federal 1 Television Network in Czech 2143 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Excerpts] Not long ago, we analyzed in our program the problems of exporting and manufacturing Czechoslovak arms. At issue then was the sale, already carried out, of 250 tanks to Syria. While shooting this feature, we learned from the manufacturer and from the export firm alike that the announced halting of arms production in our country has not materialized. In fact, more exports of Czechoslovak arms, especially to the risk regions, can be expected in the near future, because owing to their quality they can be marketed nowhere else. The risk regions are those like the Middle East, for example.

The weekly RESPEKT carried an article today dealing with the Czechoslovak arms trade. Therefore, we have compiled the following reportage on the basis of information provided by [illegible] authors (Ivan Lamper) and (Vladimir Mlynar).

The latest number of RESPEKT names four regions which could or might be threatened with the exports of our special equipment. None of these regions can be described as stable. On the contrary, at issue are parts of the world which are sensitive with regard to the current trend toward disarmament.

Case number one—Pakistan. RESPEKT says that of 36 members of the team representing trade and industry which accompanied Prime Minister Calfa during his visit to that country at the end of last year, as many as 10 people had very close ties with either the manufacture or the export of arms. A delivery of 300 tanks worth almost $200 million was to be discussed there. The documents lent to us by RESPEKT testify to this.

[First unidentified interviewee, in Slovak] Our intention is not to make things vague or to carry out—in quotation marks—any kind of dirty work. In Pakistan—and I am willing to say this openly and loudly in front of the camera—absolutely no talks were held about any deliveries of arms systems, either at the prime minister or foreign trade minister level. According to my information, talks were held at the enterprise level, and concerned deliveries of prefabricated bridge sets.

[Announcer] Number two—Libya. On 30 April 1991, just one day after President Havel stated that Czechoslovakia would not supply special equipment to unstable regions, Omnipol [Czechoslovak foreign trade company dealing with arms sales] signed a contract to send 67 tank assembly workers to Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's realm.

[First Interviewee] Since our cooperation with Libya was really grand and extensive in this respect, I think that as many as several hundred Czechoslovak experts are now working in Libya on the basis of contracts signed at different times, according to the information we have at out disposal. But I have not been informed about a departure for Libya by any other group.

[Announcer] However, Minister Baksay told us that this report is true. But its practical implementation will probably be prevented by Libya's failure to open an account. In other words, our traditional partner is not—in keeping with tradition—willing to pay.

RESPEKT also writes that a plant [word indistinct] for the overhaul of heavy military equipment will be commissioned this year.

[First interviewee] As the situation stands at present, the final commissioning of the project will be carried out in February or March this year. If we were to back out from this project, we would face the loss of banking guarantees worth $8 million now, as well as the losses incurred by the nonpayment of outstanding debts. These are worth roughly $10 million. As the current situation stands, Libya has a glut of spare parts and does not need this factory to produce the aforementioned spare parts. [passage omitted]

[Announcer] Number three—Nigeria and Yugoslavia in tandem. Yes, according to RESPEKT's sources, the Slovak firm (Unimpex) is going to export to Nigeria a consignment worth $1.5 billion, which will later be reexported to Yugoslav battlefields.

[First interviewee] I really do not have any information about this. Individual transactions are always done in such a way as to guarantee that the consignment goes to the end user. What happens to the consignment afterward is definitely not under the control of the Foreign Ministry.

[Second interviewee] In no case and under no circumstances would the ministry I am heading issue a license on this manner of trading. A commercial firm, which according to RESPEKT is (Unimpex), attempted to market it, to sell it, but this was normal marketing. It was not granted an export license for it. It did not in fact ask for one, and it would not get one if it did ask, because we know that Nigeria is one of a number of states where the issue of honesty in the decisionmaking concerning reexports needs to be very carefully considered. [passage omitted]

[First interviewee] It is quite possible that some tourist could have smuggled out a pistol. I cannot give guarantees about that. But the volumes in question... well, just think: $1.5 billion! Such quantities are possible only in wartime.

[Announcer] And finally number four—Iran. Czechoslovakia allegedly offered it a shipment of the Tamara radar system—a unique product capable of detecting even so-called invisible bombers—in place of a shipment of tanks which did not take place.

[Second interviewee] I know nothing about this. The article published in RESPEKT mentions in this context

Minister Baksay's visit to Iran, so ask him. Nor do I know anything about the technical qualities of the system you mentioned. We are not interested in such things here.

[First interviewee] I do not, of course, rule out a possible shipment of spare parts for the weapons we supplied them with in the past. This is outlined in previous contracts and agreements. We are obliged to fulfill these obligations as we are a normal trade partner.

[Announcer] So much for RESPEKT magazine and the reaction of our government representatives to it. [passage omitted]

Air Force Accused of Leaving Slovakia 'Defenseless'

AU2901104792 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 28 Jan 92 p 2

[CSTK report: "Few Aircraft in Slovakia"]

[Text] Bratislava— Only 6 percent of the combat Air Force, which is the most effective component of the Army, is deployed in Slovakia, Jan Slota, deputy to the Federal Assembly for the Slovak National Party, stated in Bratislava yesterday. "No politician seems to mind that Slovakia is basically defenseless," he said. Furthermore it emerged from the briefing that not a single combat helicopter and not a single tactical combat aircraft are deployed at Slovak airfields at present.

In the event of a conflict, it would take about five days for the aviation equipment that is deployed in the Czech Republic to become involved in combat operations launched against the state from the east. Officers from the Air Force training regiment at Piestany, who attended the briefing, voiced concern at the dismissals of pilots and aviation engineers in Slovakia and the hiring of officers for Air Force units in the Czech Republic. They said that a total of 64 posts for officers and 30 posts for junior officers were abolished in their regiment last year. On the other hand, nine military pilots and maintenance staff were hired at Prague-Kbely and 18 at Ostrava-Mosnov.

Foreign Funding Sought for Mochovce Power Plant

AU2801150592 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 27 Jan 92 p 2

[CSTK report: "$700 Million Short"]

[Text] Bratislava—Approximately $700 million is needed to complete the Mochovce nuclear power plant. Funding the project is the top priority of its sponsor, the Slovak Energy Enterprise, so that the deadlines for bringing the four units of the plant on line can be met according to the contract. As early as last year, however, the main technical contractors threatened cancellation of the contracts because of the enterprise's insolvency. The problem has been partially solved through the use of credit. The Slovak Energy Enterprise has several possible sources of financing, according to Slovak Economy Minister Jozef Belcak, with the most expedient appearing to be the offer from a consortium of large utility companies. The consortium includes German and French firms.

New Russian Trade Payment Mechanism Outlined

AU2801185692 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 27 Jan 92 pp 1,3

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Lubomir Martak by Milan Srb; place and date not given: "Guaranteeing Payment"]

[Text] In two or three years we will be able to conduct trade based on market principles with the Russian Federation and the other states established following the Soviet Union's collapse. At the moment, however, we require a mechanism making the mutual exchange of goods possible during the transition period.

We asked Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Lubomir Martak, who returned from Moscow a few days ago, about the background to the agreement on this mechanism.

[Martak] Last year we concluded an independent trade agreement with the Russian Federation. No such agreement had ever been concluded before, because we only concluded agreements with the Soviet Union. In addition, we signed a payments agreement and an inter-bank agreement. Apart from these fundamental commercial and political documents, an annual protocol on the exchange of goods is also essential for the current transitional period. After all, the exchange mechanism changes every year. The conditions were different last year. This year the Russian Government approved many reform steps, so it was necessary to create a mechanism that would define the situation in our economy and, first and foremost, the situation in the Russian economy and the laws applicable in it. Rules for the transition period are necessary mainly because we want to guarantee the supplies of essential raw materials we have long been used to. This does not only involve oil, it also involves nonferrous metals, fuel for our nuclear power plants, and a number of other commodities. The two economies—Russia's and ours—are interested in ensuring that a number of commercial links continue to function. During the transition period, we cannot just leave it to the enterprises to conduct business according to their own abilities.

[Srb] What kind of mutual trade mechanism was agreed upon?

[Martak] In essence, it is similar to last year's mechanism. In Russia the fundamental principle for allocating hard currency is essentially unchanged, but a number of regulations regarding its operation—which we conformed to—have changed. The two main features of this mechanism are:

1. Our payments for raw material imports from Russia will be held in the Czechoslovak Commercial Bank [CSOB]. We will pay our exporters from them, and they

will supply products to Russia in return. This is different from last year's mechanism when we paid Russian banks for our imports and difficulties arose and we were not paid for our exports.

2. Accepting the fundamental distribution of the foreign currency the Russian exporter will receive for his exports. For example, if an oil producer exports oil for $100, he must divert roughly $40 to the Russian Government. It will purchase medicine, food, chemical products, and machinery in our country with this money. In return for these $40, the Russian exporter will receive rubies amounting to half the dollar's stock market exchange rate. The remaining $60 will be held for the exporter in an account at the CSOB and he can purchase products in our country for them. This is direct involvement by a Russian exporter in exporting to Czechoslovakia.

[Srb] Has the method for mutual bank transfers already been determined?

[Martak] Apparently, representatives from the CSOB and the Russian Commercial Bank will meet this week and agree on how to conduct business in accordance with these accounts. Two accounts, for the federation and for enterprises, will be established in our country. At the same time, the banks will define how these accounts will be kept between them and how they will be assigned to enterprises. An inter-bank agreement will be drawn up, and we envisage that when they conclude an agreement our exporters will consult the CSOB on their payment conditions. We would like to organize two meetings in Prague and Bratislava to which we would invite all those interested in conducting business with the Russian Federation and explain the entire mechanism to them in detail.

[Srb] Is it possible to prevent enterprises from exporting to Russia if payment is not precisely guaranteed?

[Martak] It is impossible to prevent this. However, the mechanism agreed upon does not permit this for the raw materials we are guaranteeing. An enterprise will only be able to export its goods if there is money in our bank account. However, if an enterprise wants to conduct business with a Russian partner and concludes a contract stipulating that the goods must be exported first and payment is not guaranteed, then, naturally, it could find itself in difficulty. The amount of trade guaranteed by the agreement comes to roughly half the volume of trade. The other half will be implemented on the basis of free currencies and barters. Terms agreed upon by the enterprises among themselves apply here, but they are also responsible for their own actions. However, the import of raw materials in return for our products is not obligatory. This is merely an opportunity for enterprises, because if the terms offered to them by their Russian partner are unacceptable, they will, understandably, not accept them. The federal Foreign Trade Ministry is not in the least interested in forcing someone to conduct business, it is merely creating scope to ensure that business can be conducted during this transition period.

Guards Transferred From SFRY to Romania Border

LD2801130492 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Some 300-400 border guards will be transferred from the southern border to the area of the Romanian border, because fighting has calmed down lately in the southern Slav states, and in the meantime the number of border violators and illegal immigrants has been increasing along the border region neighboring Romania. This was said by Janos Zubek, spokesman of the Border Guard. Defense Ministry spokesman Gyorgy Keleti stated that the necessary military measures will continue to be maintained along the southern border stretch.

Jeszenszky on Economic Refugees, Security Policy

AU2801144892 Vienna KURIER in German 27 Jan 92 p 5

["Exclusive" interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by Hans-Henning Scharsach; place and date not given: " 'Hungary Can Rely on Its Friends in Vienna'"]

[Text] [Scharsach] The conversion to the market economy in Eastern Europe seems to be more difficult than expected.

[Jeszenszky] In Hungary, nobody expected the transition to be easy. Personally, I even expected problems to be worse. Hungary will be one of the first countries to overcome the difficult phase.

[Scharsach] Even in Hungary, production is decreasing while inflation and unemployment figures are rising.

[Jeszenszky] For the citizens, it is of little consolation that the situation is even worse in other countries. Nevertheless, we have good reason to be optimistic. It is true that industrial production shrank, but it shrank much less than statistics would have one believe. Under communism, many things were only produced for the statistics, to create the impression of full employment and economic upswing. There were many useless things that we no longer produce, and many others that could be sold only at a great loss. In the market economy, there is no room even for those kind of products. Nevertheless, the most important point is: Statistics distort the true picture. In the past, enterprises would invariably give larger production figures, while private companies today tend to provide smaller figures.

[Scharsach] Is your government not too optimistic?

[Jeszenszky] Well, it has something to do with the fact that nobody expected such a rapid collapse of the Soviet Union. Nobody was able to anticipate how much we would lose on that market. Nevertheless, I believe that we have done quite well. We are the only East European country with a positive balance of goods and services.

[Scharsach] But also with high debts!

[Jeszenszky] That is our main problem. The communist system concealed its bankruptcy by taking on irresponsibly high credits. We will suffer from this old burden for quite a while to come.

[Jeszenszky] Many Hungarians do not share the government's optimism.

[Jeszenszky] That is normal. During the many years under the communists, the people had to make major sacrifices and again and again were promised great things for the future. Now democracy has come and is also demanding sacrifices and the government is once again making promises. It is only natural that people become impatient. We must prevent people from becoming disappointed with democracy and turning their backs on it. There will always be authoritarian seducers who want to make political capital out of misery.

[Scharsach] Should the West provide greater help?

[Jeszenszky] First of all, we must help ourselves. Only those who succeed through their own strength will become an attractive and reliable partner for others, which is what we are trying to become. We want to do business with the West and convince enterprises that it is profitable to invest in Hungary. Everything else will come automatically. In the past few months, inflation has slowed down. Even production is gaining momentum. By the end of next year, at the latest, our economy will begin to grow again, even statistically.

[Scharsach] Are you pinning your hopes on the association agreement with the EC?

[Jeszenszky] This agreement is very important for us, particularly because it also offers us the prospect of membership. At the same time, we also know that only those who are competitive will benefit from membership. The association agreement will help us to become competitive by being granted access to the market faster than we have to open our own market to others.

[Scharsach] Once Austria joins the EC, it will move further away from its old trade partners in the East. Our border will then become an external border of the EC.

[Jeszenszky] As far as Hungary is concerned, Austrian EC membership will certainly be an advantage. We know that we can rely on our friends in Vienna. We are not competitors, but partners. We are not only linked through shared history, but also through a shared future in a common Europe.

[Scharsach] When do you expect to become an EC member?

[Jeszenszky] For us it would be good if membership came as soon as possible. With great optimism, one might hope for 1995. Personally, I expect that it will take at least one year longer. What is certain is that we have

to be fully integrated before the turn of the century, so that we do not fall too far behind.

[Scharsach] After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Hungary is also anxious to be integrated in terms of security policy.

[Jeszenszky] Of course. We are very satisfied with the results of the last NATO meeting and hope that the alliance will help stabilize Europe in a way that prevents another conflict like the current one in Yugoslavia. At the same time, we want to actively struggle for further progress in the sphere of international law. The principle of nonintervention must no longer have precedence over human rights and self-determination.

[Scharsach] You are pleading for an international law to prevent crises like the current one in Yugoslavia?

[Jeszenszky] I think the most important task for Europe is to cooperate and make sure that wars can no longer be waged. It must be possible to bring about peace, human rights, and self-determination. Much will depend on whether peace is now achieved in Yugoslavia. Success by the international organizations would give a signal.

[Scharsach] Austria and Hungary have problems with their neighbor Serbia.

[Jeszenszky] Both countries will now try to clear all misunderstandings quickly. I think that we must not simply wait until the Serbs need us because they depend on our transport routes or telephone connections. We must make an active contribution to establishing good-neighborly relations. Of course, Serbian accusations during the war were quite adventurous and pathetic. Yet, now it is insignificant whether they were right or wrong. What matters now is whether the Serbian population believes them. We Hungarians are above all responsible for our 400,000 fellow countrymen in Vojvodina. We must prevent them from becoming the victims of a dispute between Belgrade and Budapest.

[Scharsach] One of the central topics during your visit to Vienna will be the refugee problem.

[Jeszenszky] Of course, because it is a problem that we share. We know that in Romania and in the countries of the former USSR, there are hundreds of thousands of people who want to emigrate to improve their living conditions. Hungary cannot accept economic refugees. Neither do we want to become a transit country. This is why, along with Austria, we must work out strategies for halting the stream of refugees.

[Scharsach] How should that work?

[Jeszenszky] Mainly through information. Most people in the East have wrong ideas of the opportunities abroad. They make great sacrifices and are disappointed when their dreams fall through and they are sent back. We must find channels to inform them at an early stage and free them from such illusions. Economic refugees do not have a country to go to. The West must provide assistance so that those people can help themselves at home, that they stay there and contribute to the reconstruction of their home countries.

Foreign Affairs Committee Views Serbian Ties

AU2801142592 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 23 Jan 92 p 3

[Report by Lambert: "Foreign Affairs Committee in Support of Fostering Serb Relations"]

[Excerpts] The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian parliament removed the planned discussion on security policy guidelines from the agenda on 22 January, citing the fact that the situation around Hungary was in such a state of constant change that the prepared document needed to be revised. Instead, current issues of foreign policy were discussed. At the session, a statement was accepted on the Foreign Affairs Committee protesting against the serious threats against Presbyterian Bishop Laszlo Tokes, and the committee is to inform the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Romanian Parliament about its objections to the distortions in the Romanian national census.

Speaking about the Hungarian Government's assessment of the current political situation, Foreign Affairs State Secretary Tamas Katona, an invited speaker, said that Budapest would also have willingly recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia, and it is possible that the latter will be recognized next month, in concert with the EC. As for the future, Hungarian foreign policy reckons with six republics and two provinces in a special situation, and it also considers it important to foster relations with Serbia. We do not want to approach the issue from the wrong angle; we have to create a workable arrangement and take the initiative in this area, Katona said. During the session, a minor debate arose on the extent to which it was worthwhile developing our relations with the current Serbian leadership, starting from gathering information on the spot, and including signing various agreements. Gyula Horn, chairman of the committee, finally argued that the Serbian leadership was legitimized by its electorate, and international relations could not be handled on an ideological basis.

Answering some questions, Tamas Katona explained that Hungary wanted to respect both the external and internal borders of Yugoslavia according to pre-civil war conditions. As for Vojvodina, we consider autonomy to be the most suitable form of handling the national minority issues and, according to Katona, there is a great need for functioning autonomy in this region. [passage omitted]

The letter from President Arpad Goncz to Serbian President Milosevic was a topic of debate between the members of various parties. Referring to this letter, Gyorgy Csoti considered it important for the president of the republic to coordinate significant foreign policy activities with the Foreign Affairs Committee. At the same time, Istvan Szentivanyi pointed out that the president of the republic stood above the parliament and

made statements in the name of the nation. According to Horn, Arpad Goncz's letter, just as all his foreign policy activities, could be seen as very positive, and the first conciliatory Serbian reactions could be a result of this, too. In his answer closing this item on the agenda, Tamas Katona said that the president did not conduct an independent foreign policy, and it was important for him to be above institutions because, this way, he was able to make full use of his moral assets. [passage omitted]

National Bank Chairman Outlines 1992 Tasks

AU2801192792 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 27 Jan 92 p 6

[Interview with Akos Peter Bod, chairman of the Hungarian National Bank, by Laszlo Doczy; place and date not given: "Akos Peter Bod: "Past the Critical Year—Strict Financial Policy Will Continue"]

[Excerpts] When the former industry and trade minister was appointed head of the Hungarian National Bank [MNB], a person very familiar with the situation and difficulties of the real economic sphere took office. Having this knowledge, what changes is he planning in monetary policy, what are his views on 1991, and what tasks does he assign for 1992? These are the topics of our interview with the recently appointed central bank chairman. [passage omitted]

[Doczy] What are the tasks of the monetary system in 1992?

[Bod] The situation will change in 1992. Achieving external balance will not be our main concern, instead, we can concentrate our forces on other important tasks. Such tasks are the modernization of the banking system or preparation for convertibility, which requires serious work both from a technical and an organizational point of view. It might sound a little strange, but we also have to learn to live with decreasing inflation. We have grown accustomed to high inflation, and now, after the bank interest rates have started to decrease, citizens will get less interest on their savings. This new phenomena will probably also change the distribution of incomes between the state budget, the banks, and the production sphere.

[Doczy] What are the MNB's plans for taking up loans and issuing bonds?

[Bod] Notwithstanding what I have said, the continuous financing of our enormous foreign debt will remain a major problem and our efforts to include foreign resources will be part of this. Our deficit necessitates either borrowing or acquiring resources worth $2.4 million that we want to implement partly through the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other official channels, and partly through issuing bonds.

For example Germany, previously our main market, has become too expensive because of the increased interest rates. Our apparatus specialized in issuing bonds is constantly looking for the cheapest markets. In this respect, some new countries also appear that could not be considered in the past because they either did not see our changes clearly or considered Hungary to be too risky. For example, Switzerland and the United States are such countries. To achieve all this, it is, of course, necessary that, based on the ability to pay, Hungary and the MNB be put in a category that allows us to enter the given markets in real terms. Rather than by borrowing, the central bank wants to finance the state budget deficit through bonds that can be sold abroad. [passage omitted]

[Doczy] As an industry minister, you were rather critical of the Hungarian bank system. What can you do to improve the system in your capacity as MNB chairman?

[Bod] Indeed, I was dissatisfied with the position of Hungarian industry and the development level of the financial system, and eight out of 10 foreigners said the same. Namely, a bank transfer takes an impossibly long time, and they cannot do certain transactions here. Entrepreneurs also complain a lot about the difficult credit conditions. We often say that the Hungarian bank system is more developed than the bank system of the other socialist countries, and we started to modernize earlier than they did. Nevertheless, it is also a fact that certain institutions are still missing—for example, the guarantee funds and venture capital institutions—there are technically underdeveloped areas, and the financial sphere often shows insensitivity toward material sphere matters.

[Doczy] Are you planning any changes in financial policy?

[Bod] The easing of the so far "strict" monetary policy just because I took office is out of the question—many people expected that the new man from the real sphere would be softer—because it has not been particularly strict anyway. In recent years, the amount of money increased regularly faster than the gross domestic production. I rather facilitate the creation of the missing links, establish closer ties with the newly created states, and help form the economic policy by analyzing and publishing data. The MNB will gradually have to remove all the functions of a commercial bank. As someone coming from the real sphere, I consider market protection to be important but only by using the international rules of the game. Even as an industry minister, I did not demand subsidies, production grants, or protective customs duties to the detriment of the national economy.

Deputies, Lithuanian Officials on Minority Rights

LD2501234792 Warsaw PAP in English 1821 GMT 25 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 25—Representatives of the Polish group in the parliament of Lithuania and deputies to the Polish Sejm (lower house) from the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) Saturday [25 January] negatively assessed the Polish Government's eastern policy. A communique issued following the meeting of Ryszard Maciejkianc and Stanislaw Pieszko with KPN leader Leszek Moczulski and members of the KPN caucus says that the Polish-Lithuanian declaration signed by Polish Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski during his recent visit to Vilnius does not guarantee due rights to the Polish minority in Lithuania. According to the Lithuanian guests, the "current situation in Lithuania indicates that the position of Poles inhabiting the Vilnius region is deteriorating." They spoke of infringement of citizens' rights of the Polish population, progressing colonization of the regions around Vilnius traditionally populated by Poles and ever more cases of Poles being fired from jobs.

[Warsaw PAP in English at 1948 GMT on 25 January adds in a Warsaw-datelined report: "Deteriorating situation of Polish minority in Lithuania was discussed Saturday by Polish parliamentarians of the Christian National Union (ZCHN) and representatives of the Polish deputies to the Lithuanian parliament, Ryszard Maciejkianc and Stanislaw Pieszko. The ZCHN parliamentary caucus decided to invite Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski to its nearest meeting in order to clarify some issues related to the Polish-Lithuanian declaration and guarantees of rights for the Polish minority in Lithuania."]

Sejm Committee on Lithuanian Elections in Areas

LD2501143292 Warsaw PAP in English 2102 GMT 25 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 24—The presidium of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee and Polish deputies to the Lithuanian Supreme Council Ryszard Maciejkianiec and Stanislaw Pieszko discussed in Warsaw Friday [24 January] the state and prospects for the implementation of the Polish-Lithuanian declaration of January 13, 1992.

An official communique on the meeting says that representatives of the Polish floor group in the Lithuanian parliament pointed to the significance of the realization of the declaration's provisions on refraining from changing nationality relations on the territories inhabited by the Polish minority and to the need to swiftly elect self-government councils in these territories.

Russian Gas Deliveries To Reach Sufficient Level

LD2801120192 Warsaw PAP in English 2141 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Moscow, Jan. 27—Within the next week the deliveries of Russian natural gas to Poland should reach the level enabling Polish economy to function normally, Polish Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Adam Glapinski said following his talks here Monday [27 January] with Russia's Deputy Premier Yegor Gaydar and head of the Russian Committee for Foreign Economic Cooperation Pyotr Aven.

"Problems in this sphere are not the result of ill-will displayed by any of the sides but are directly related to the new systemic solutions introduced by President Yeltsin's decree which essentially changes the question of payments," Minister Glapinski added. He explained that the Polish-Russian agreement of last December 24 thus failed to come into force and the deliveries of gas it envisaged were realized in 55 per cent.

"This was the main subject of today's talks which brought an agreement ensuring the deliveries at the level of 6.6 billion cubic meters annually," Glapinski said. He added that amount covered only in 92.3 per cent the demand of Polish industry which needed the supplies of some 7.1 billion cubic metres of gas. "We have agreed that the level of deliveries will reach the proper volume in a week's time. We have also agreed that the talks will be continued to increase the deliveries," Glapinski stressed.

Minister Glapinski did not hide it that the Polish side wanted to see the December agreement come into effect. He stressed however that assessing the situation realistically the Polish side had to consent to a formal change of the agreement to take place on Russia's initiative.

"Apart from the questions related to the deliveries of gas we have also reached agreement on payments for food and energy supplies to the Soviet Army units stationing in Poland," Glapinski said.

Army To Oversee Former Soviet Garrison Property

LD2901063792 Warsaw PAP in English 1701 GMT 29 Jan 92

[Text] Koszalin, Jan. 28—The prime minister made a decision under which the locality of Borne-Sulinowo, Koszalin Province, northwestern Poland, which used to be the home of a Soviet garrison, will be gradually taken over by the Polish Army to prevent devastation and theft of property.

The decision was announced Tuesday [28 January] by the government's plenipotentiary for the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland during a session here of the provincial defense committee.

After a few months the property, consisting of some 700 pieces of real estate, will be handed over by the Polish Army to civilian authorities.

There are several more towns in the province which formerly hosted Soviet garrisons and now face problems with finding the money necessary to repair and convert to civilian purposes the facilities used by the Army. It is not ruled out that tender bidding will be held in order to sell some of the property.

Olszewski Regrets Romaszewski Not NIK Chairman

LD2701092592 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0600 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] In a statement for NOWY SWIAT [NEW WORLD], Prime Minister Jan Olszewski stated that it was very bad that the Sejm had not elected the chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK]. Prime Minister Olszewski recalled that NIK has been without permanent leadership for nearly two years. Olszewski expressed regret that Zbigniew Romaszewski had not been elected to the post of NIK chairman because he was a person with suitable qualifications and was known for his integrity and for not giving in to any pressure in his activity and decisionmaking. Premier Olszewski also pointed out that without the leadership it is difficult to talk about replacing NIK's old structure.

Olszewski Announces Economic 'Rescue Plan'

LD2701034292 Warsaw PAP in English 2217 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 26—Premier Jan Olszewski said on Sunday [26 January] that the government will not give-in to demands lodged during hunger strikes, for it is not a legitimate form of protest in a democratic state.

Premier Olszewski appearing on television Sunday evening announced plans to work-out a rescue plan for Poland's economy. The premier expressed hope that the government programme will be attractive to a number of political parties.

The premier upheld his main charges against the two previous governments of not presenting clearly enough the issue of the state of the country and stressed that the society had the right to know the truth.

Solidarity Says Price Hikes To Harm Customers

LD2501143892 Warsaw PAP in English 2240 GMT 24 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 24—According to Solidarity experts, customers will pay 5.2 trillion zlotys (473 million dollars) more, rather than 1.5 trillion zlotys (136 million dollars) more as is officially said, for gas and electricity in the first quarter of 1992 as a result of rises in their prices and most part of this sum will be paid by individual customers.

Quoting the experts' report, Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski said Friday during a nationwide meeting of the National Alliance of Solidarity Factory Commissions and the Union of Employees' Property at the Warsaw steel mill that out of 18 trillion zlotys (1.6 billion dollars) collected as part of higher prices only 5 trillion zlotys (455 million dollars) would be paid by factories.

Krzaklewski stated that the government would have to reconsider the issue and decide to clearly reduce the prices of energy. He said there was a chance to hold constructive talks on this topic and to negotiate a stabilization treaty. He added the Solidarity negotiating team would meet on the coming Monday and that talks with the government should start on Wednesday [29 January].

Representatives of Solidarity factory commissions and the Union of the Employees' Property opposed the Solidarity National Commission's abandoning of its rigid stand on the suspension of energy price hikes and demanded immediate talks with the government on this topic. They also said that the national commission should take steps in the parliament and government to bring about a systemic solution to problems of the economy's functioning.

Unions Support Motion To Void Pension Law

LD2901054292 Warsaw PAP in English 1653 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Warsaw, Jan. 28—A 1,500 strong crowd of unionists and pensioners picketed the Sejm building here Tuesday [28 January] for three hours in support of the motion now before the Constitutional Tribunal calling for declaring the latest version of the pension law incompatible with the Constitution.

The picketers, led by the Miners Trade Unions Federation leaders, held signs reading "A good pensioner is a dead pensioner" and "Lech (Walesa), you have sold Poland, we will sell you, too."

Addressing the crowd, leader of the Democratic Left parliamentary club in the Sejm Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said he hoped the tribunal, holding its session in the Sejm building, "will rise to the occasion." He also put the blame for Poland's current economic problems on "those day dreamers who took to reforming the economy without the slightest idea of what should be done."

A leader of the OPZZ [All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions], Stanislaw Wisniewski, told picketers that if the tribunal failed to declare the pension law unconstitutional, then the OPZZ would lodge a complaint with the International Commission on Human Rights based in Strasburg. "The OPZZ will accuse the Polish Government and parliament of infringement of the international covenants of economic, social and political rights," said Wisniewski.

The pension law was brought before the tribunal following motions from the miners union, the OPZZ and the ombudswoman, who maintained that the law broke the rules of a state which is based on the rule of law.

The greatest ire of miners and some other labour groups has been provoked by clauses in the new law which effectively cut their pensions down.

Daily Questions Legitimacy of UDMR as Party

AU2301203092 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 17 Jan 92 pp 1, 5

[Grigore Traian Pop article: "Will Ardeal Have Only Hungarian Mayors?"]

[Text] The atomized multiparty system, which has emerged as though in recoil at the totalitarian formula of the single party, runs the risk of acquiring some paradoxical aspects in our country. The lists of mayoral candidates in many localities contain scores of hopefuls for the position of first administrator, which is only natural since the main political groupings, as well as some independents, want to test their popularity, credibility, and electoral slogans in anticipation of the general elections next May. But most of all, they also want to win in the local echelons of power, since destinies are also being made there and decisions of national and, why not admit it, of group or individual interest, are made there, too. On the other hand, for most parties, the 9 February local elections are more important than the 1990 general elections, where they practically have no chance whatsoever. However, they stand some chance now, and, depending on these results, they might be able to tackle the general elections next May.

The situation in certain Ardeal counties is special. Where the Hungarians are in a majority, the UDMR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania] will win for sure, since it is the best situated party of the Democratic Alliance there. But even in localities (communes, towns, and municipalities) without a Hungarian majority, it is enough to make some simple calculations to realize that the Hungarians may actually be elected there, too: They participate with one candidate, while the Romanians will put forward some 10-15 candidates, if not more. This will inevitably lead to a splitting of the votes 10-15 ways, while the Hungarians will vote in a bloc. Nobody can hold that against them. The vote is secret and democratic and the choice is free. Only the criteria are false. While the Hungarians will overwhelmingly choose the ethnic path, the Romanians will try to follow the political one, that is, the moral political course. Consequently, there is a risk that a candidate may get elected, not because he is a good administrator, impartial, incorruptible, and competent, but simply because he is Hungarian.

If Vatra Romaneasca had tried to form coalitions and present a single Romanian candidate locally, people would have said that this was undemocratic, that nationalism was acquiring institutionalized forms, and that the rights of the Hungarian minority were affected. There is no doubt that enough Romanians would have foolishly gone along with that assessment....

But this issue brings up an older one, namely, the legitimacy and constitutionality of the UDMR as a political grouping. The policy being made in a country, regardless of who is making it and how one-dimensional it may be, cannot harm the interests of that country. Can you imagine that a country like the United States, which is considered a model of modern democracy, would tolerate a political party that represents the interests of another country or a political party of Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Russians, or Hungarians? When the United States' national interests were endangered, the U.S. authorities—ignoring the so-called wave of world indignation—did not hesitate to introduce the electric chair and invite the traitors onto its hot seat.

However, since I do not want to convey the impression that I wish Messrs. Laszlo Tokes [Bishop of Oradea and UDMR honorary president] and Geza Domokos [UDMR president] the same fate, I hasten to add that the two individuals' lack of loyalty toward the Romanian state and nation is a proven thing and still nothing has happened to them. Moreover, I was told that the Oradea bishop's personal guard has been increased, since terrible news has come in from Budapest: The Hungarians themselves might be prepared to kill him in order to unleash anti-Romanian outrage in Europe and the world. Hungarian chauvinism has reached completely alarming proportions, bordering on mystical delirium.

But let us go back to electoral campaign developments in Ardeal: The Romanians are duty-bound, at least now, at the eleventh hour, to wake up and give their vote to the best candidate among their own. Of course, it is difficult to do something now, but not impossible. The candidates with lesser chances—something that is not so hard to assess—should declare in the mass media that they cede their vote to the best placed Romanian candidate.

However, since I do not wish to present concrete solutions, only to warn of a serious development, I am convinced that the electorate will realize where the danger lies and will act accordingly.

Bucharest Mayoral Candidate Outlines Goals

AU2801194692 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 23 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with "Nica Leon, president of the Free Democratic Party and candidate to the position of general mayor of Bucharest" by Mircea Florin Sandru; place and date not given: "If I Become Mayor I Will Have a Firm Hand"]

[Excerpts] [Sandru] What are the considerations that determine and give you the right to aspire to the position of general mayor of Bucharest?

[Leon] The same that prompted me before December 1989 to firmly speak out against Ceausescu and the communist regime, to criticize the dictatorship, and to write to the Legislative Council to alter the antinational laws that are against the people's interests. It is the desire to protect these people who deserve to live a civilized life in a civilized country with a political and socioeconomic system that will guarantee them prosperity and give them back their hope and joy.

[Sandru] Saying that they are the same considerations, do you want to imply that not much has changed in Romania in the wake of the December 1989 revolution?

[Leon] Yes. The situation has not improved; on the contrary, it has become more serious than during Ceausescu's time. [passage omitted] The people of this country are completely desperate. [passage omitted]

Regarding the reasons that prompt me to run for the position of mayor, I want to mention that life has demonstrated that my thinking is correct, and I hope that this will be proved and that my fellow citizens will vote for me in the coming local elections. After the 14th Congress I wrote to Ceausescu to tell him to resign because he was senile and sick. [passage omitted] I also told him that the first man who will have the courage to chant against communism at a meeting organized by the communists will make this system disappear like chaff blown away by a storm. That was my theory. I applied it in practice at the meeting on 21 December 1989. Then, within the National Unity Provisional Council, I drew people's attention to the fact that they should not vote for those who are confiscating the revolution. They did not listen to me. They said I was talking through my hat. I quarreled with Mr. Iliescu in vain.

[Sandru] Do you hope to be elected at the helm of the administration of a city which, as you well know, is in a deplorable state? The whole country is going through critical times. What are the factors that have caused this continuous deterioration of the socioeconomic situation?

[Leon] You may recall that we inherited an industry that was functioning; we inherited an agriculture which—no matter how poorly—somehow met food requirements, and we inherited a trade network that still offered products at low prices. [passage omitted] It is clear that we have not reached the current situation solely because of objective processes. The main reason is the incompetence and ill faith of the government. [passage omitted]

[Sandru] Do you think you have the necessary competence to be the general mayor of a city confronted with tremendous difficulties?

[Leon] Although I am young, I can look back on 20 working years. All those years I have never taken upon myself a task I was unable to fulfill. [passage omitted]

[Sandru] In your view, what are the greatest difficulties faced by Bucharest?

[Leon] The tragedy is that there is hardly any food, and the sparse foodstuffs that exist are very expensive. [passage omitted]

[Sandru] What other trouble does Bucharest face?

[Leon] The housing shortage. [passage omitted] I would take measures to ensure that Bucharest's heating installations operate appropriately. I would ensure constant warm water and heating, because the way they are supplied now—intermittently—we lose more than we gain. [passage omitted]

[Sandru] How do you propose to annihilate the phenomenon of corruption?

[Leon] By asking the bodies empowered by law to do their duty. Unfortunately, the local administration law leaves the mayor too little latitude of action. For instance, to be able to reduce violations and to discourage corruption, the mayor should have the local police at his disposal. In other civilized capitals, the mayor is also the chief of police. In our country, the law stipulates that the mayor is to ensure public order "with the help" of the police. [passage omitted] The situation is bad; Bucharest is swarming with scams and thieves. It looks like an exhibition behind bars; all stores have installed bars at their shop windows against burglars. If I am elected mayor I will have a firm hand.

Failed Challenge to Roman's Leadership Analyzed

92BA0341C Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 24 Dec 91 pp 1, 5

[Doina Diaconu article: "FSN 'Mutiny' Fails, But Victory Is Just an Armistice"]

[Text] After many weeks of arguments between Modrogan and Cotroceni, fraught with dissention within the Front, the Steering College met Friday afternoon for seven hours; the session was called first of all to set the date of the National Convention and implicitly establish its ordinary or extraordinary character, and only secondly to debate the situation of the electoral campaign and to define the strategy of the general elections, items which although listed on the agenda, were amply ignored by the speakers.

As the record shows, the whole Iliescu-Roman conflict and its echoes within the Front commandeered the discussion, the desire for ideologic clarification being overshadowed by the "mutinous" designs of Marian Enache's—FSN [National Salvation Front] leader in the Chamber of Deputies—initiative group. The first fundamental question sought to establish the kind of organization the FSN is, what program it has, and whether it is possible to speak of a shift to the right. Enache and about three other speakers held the opinion that the Iliescu-Roman dispute did not represent a spurious problem, but that it was a fundamental issue based on a major ideologic conflict between the initial social-democratic orientation and the more recent liberal tendencies of those surrounding the national leader. As opposition leader, Enache believes that "we have been committing an ideologic error for some time" and that now "we must openly tell the truth: the Roman government did not belong to the FSN, thus leading to political incoherence; power prerogatives in the government have been transferred; connections have been broken and the other members of Parliament could no longer work in the Executive Office; the tie to the party has been severed; currently, due to the structure of the Stolojan government, the majority party can

no longer control the activity of the executive; and the FSN does not have a practical political program for the next transition stage (...only by clarifying the ideologic position of this party can we perform pertinent economic analyses)."

In this respect, Enache surprisingly ignored the interest in forming a government of national exposure, raised by President Iliescu more than recently. In conclusion: "Romania is a flying plane which does not know how to land in the next transition stage: The anticommunist slogan and sentimentality are finished; what are the practical solutions for overcoming the crisis?" The Front was not brought to power only by the Iliescu-Roman charismatic duo, but also by its political platform; the present "ideologic stammering" disorients the members of the Front; the signers of the Declaratior-Appeal (broadcast on television) remain devoted to social-democracy, and "all those who do not profess and fulfill the ideals of social-democracy stand outside this position and represent something else. We must present ourselves as the defenders of this position."

As former member of the Roman government and the economic brain of the reform with direct responsibility in this regard, Eugen Dijmarescu also started from the premise that what is important for the future FSN is to define its ideology and program. By invoking "an open challenge that blames not only the former government but the Executive Office as well, and puts the Roman management in a certain light," repudiating the motion presented at the convention, Dijmarescu concisely demonstrated, based on a report that will be published, that "if during the 15 months of the Roman government Romanian economy resources dropped by 40 percent and production decreased by 25 percent during the entire interval, it means one thing: that the reform, however imperfect it might be, is responsible for this 15-point difference, and that the economy did not plunge at the same rate as resources." "Given the accusations that have been made: incompetence, lack of experience, experimentation with the national economy, tendencies to inflexibility, elitism, and a shift to the right," the speaker presented some of the causes for an economic condition that "will not be changed by the fact that there is no longer a Roman government," and invited the listeners to reflect "whether another form of government, another policy, could have done better." The question was obviously left hanging, the sole specialty of the debaters unfortunately being speeches from the podium.

In turn, Petre Roman wanted to remind today's opponents that the reform program initiated after the elections was approved without reserve by the FSN parliamentarians, and that the motion "A Future for Romania" was adopted by secret vote at the March National Convention. Through its social composition, this reform program remains faithful to the party's initial platform. Referring to the FSN-PNL [National Liberal Party] alliance in the present government, Roman stated that it is primarily due to President Iliescu's choice, and that in his opinion nothing good can come from this alliance, not even in terms of foreign aid. Regarding the shift to the right, after mentioning an impressive number of contacts with European social-democracy, the national leader reached several conclusions: "They all agreed that there exists a fundamental distinction between democratic parties (social-democratic, liberal, conservative, labor) and parties of nondemocratic design (communist)." Despite his persuasive efforts, the FSN is considered a party of communist design. "Social-democracy recognizes that the market economy and freedom for economic initiative are the keystones of democracy. Democracy is not equivalent to a market economy, but the market economy is part of democracy, because only abundance provides enough for sharing. And that is our situation: We don't have abundance and we don't have anything to share. In other words, first and foremost we must build democracy and therefore a market economy. The state must assume a role in redistributing abundance aimed at social justice." As such, in order to destroy the ambiguities that burden Romania's image in the world, and implicitly the country's economic situation, the FSN must prove to be a truly democratic party.

Constantin Sorescu, Ionel Blaga, and Ioan Moldovan deemed that the economic strategy can be none other than the one dictated by reality, independently of whether some call it social-democracy and others liberal. Without a professional adaptation to the demands imposed by the reformation of this reality, any political program becomes populist demagogy and sterile rhetoric.

Returning to the Iliescu-Roman conflict, the overwhelming majority of the speakers considered it as devoid of purpose, artificial, and damaging to the party unity that must be maintained, since the NSF is the only organization currently capable of assuring democratization in Romania, and since its fate will determine the fate of the nation. Representatives of the steering colleges of local organizations in particular, not especially responsive to ideologic dissertations, insisted on drawing attention to that fact.

A second problem concerned the possibility of a national convention before local elections. Despite all attempts of the Enache team to elude the statutes and to schedule an extraordinary national convention before local elections in January, intended to oust Roman and his followers from the present Executive Office, the vote decided by 121 to 28 to organize an ordinary national convention in March. The cabal led by Enache, which has recently been said to have an open door in Cotroceni and which was expected to succeed Roman, thus missed its mark. More than a victory, the decision of the Steering College sealed an armistice. The decisive battle will therefore take place at the convention before the general elections, after which we will know whether the party remains united or splits. Until then, the warning of representative Ionel

Blaga—"Mr. Roman, the unity of the Front is in your hands!"—offers several suggestions.

While the social-democracy-liberalism dispute proved to be a fastidious, amateurish polemic without arguments (one representative maliciously observed that the leader of the anti-Roman cabal had not done his homework), despite the adamant insistence to the contrary on the part of the Enache group, the tensions that have arisen within the Front could not be lessened at the end of the long session. At the present time there exist within the Front a number of conflicts that pit pro-Roman against anti-Roman currents, the parliamentary groups of the former government against the Executive Office, local organizations against parliamentary groups, nontechnocrats against technocrats, and the old against the young.

Responsible for this situation are, on one hand, a restructuring and internal clarification process natural for any party at the beginnings of its true crystallization, and the emergence of different opinions regarding future solutions and strategies; and on the other hand, rivalries among various pretenders to supremacy, obstinacy, and the struggle for power.

TV Plans for Covering Elections Protested

92BA0402A Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 11 Jan 92 p 4

[Communique of the Romania Mare Party signed by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Mircea Musat, Radu Theodoru, and Theodor Paraschiv]

[Text] The Steering Committee of the Romania Mare Party [PRM] expresses its stupefaction and disappointment about the manner in which the electoral campaign is proceeding under the intermediary of Romanian Television.

Having ascertained these ad nauseam repeated patterns, the PRM Steering Committee came to the conclusion that it was its right and duty to decide how to pursue its own electoral campaign in the press. Along this line, on 9 January 1992 we addressed an official note to the Parliamentary Electoral Commission in which we requested that the total of 27 minutes of air time to which we are entitled for one month should be judiciously distributed, in compliance with the electoral law, but also with our propaganda system. Thus, we requested to show on television two 10-minute videos and another seven-minute video, which add up to the same time allotment of 27 minutes. We did not request anything more than that, nor did we pursue preferential treatment. Any thinking person who wishes to be effectively understood by his electorate will agree that such communication with the public is infinitely more efficient than the incredible fragmentation of nine three-minute appearances! What can a politician or a city mayoral candidate say in three minutes? He can say nothing other than good evening, bless you, and the obligatory promises that sound like a broken record repeated to the point of exasperation. The PRM's situation is different from the others in that, although we have branches in almost 40 counties and in all five Bucharest districts, in our over six months of existence we received no attention from television. Some of our important events—such as wreath-layings and other festivities organized at the Deslu Monastery, which houses the head of Vojvod Michael the Brave, and at Avram Iancu's grave in Tebea—were distorted by the television and our presence was not mentioned. In fact, we never had an opportunity to show the public on television any of our donations, philantropic actions, and aid to churches or to the archeological dig at Sarmisegetuza. The discriminatory treatment to which we have been subjected has severely handicapped us in the elections, in addition to our older complaint, which is that to this day we still do not have even the most basic office in Bucharest, not even one room, something that is a considerable obstacle in our activities. In these conditions it was imperative that we demand to consolidate our air space in order to manage to introduce our political party as conclusively as possible, and in order to explain this party's roots, the main points of its platform, and its activities to date at both central and regional level, to those who do not know us or who are victims of disinformation.

Unfortunately, however, our request to the Parliamentary Electoral Commission was turned down. The reason given was that none of the parties was willing to defer its three-minute spot in order to allow us this consolidation operation. We are convinced that if tact and patience had been employed, several parties could have been identified who would have been glad to give up this time fragmentation in exchange for being able to express themselves at greater leisure. We want to talk more about the state of our nation than about the horses of the young liberals chasing off the wolves of the old liberals, or about the sledding slopes with which one candidate wanted to bless the country. You must admit that one cannot discuss the fate of a country in just three minutes, especially during the current dramatic domestic and foreign conditions. Imagine how preposterous it would be to try to teach in school the Pades Proclamation of the 1821 revolution, or the fundamental acts of the Unification of 1 December 1918 in bits and pieces, three minutes today, three minutes tomorrow, and so forth. No one would be able to understand anything. Not to mention the fact that the much trumpeted democracy is being violated at every step. We are referring particularly to the fact that television is favoring the parties represented in Parliament at the expense of those who are not, because they were established later or did not want to join lucrative alliances and associations. Normally, the reverse should have been the case: More space should have been awarded on the eve of elections to parties that are not represented in Parliament, because people want to learn about them, while they have watched the others for almost two years and know of what they are capable and to what situation they have brought this country.

Unfortunately, we are compelled to note with regret that this is another form of censorship: While in the case of

the written press the censorship is an economic one, expressed through the aberrant price of newsprint, in the case of the television electoral campaign it is a matter of time censorship that cuts you short just when you are going strong.

We want to end by once again warmly appealing, through the intermediary of the mass media, for an urgent change in the arbitrary and arrogant attitude of the Parliamentary Electoral Commission. Our observer at the Parliamentary Commission has told us the reasons for which our request was turned down: Mr. Razvan Theodorescu cited the fact that the model of minute spots was taken from the Western democracies (?!), while Mr. Cazimir Ionescu opined that it might create havoc on the computer," thereby introducing a completely unknown term in the Romanian political science. We would like to ask the two gentlemen: Who is running in the election? The computer, or the parties, and who will come out to vote, the West, or the Romanian people? By virtue of the freedom of expression and the political rights so painfully gained, we demand that the Electoral Law be observed, and that law specifically stipulates that each party is free to decide on how to run its own electoral campaign and select its suitable means of expression, as long as they do not violate the norms in effect and do not prejudice the other political groups. In short, esteemed Parliament members, break the moulds, give a little less thought to your seats in the future Parliament and more thought to the tragedy of this fatherland which, rest assured, we do not love less than you do.

Signed, PRM Steering Committee: Corneliu Vadim Tudor, PRM chairman; Eugen Barbu, first deputy chairman; Mircea Musat, deputy chairman; Colonel (Retired) Radu Theodoru, deputy chairman; Brigadier General (Retired) Theodor Paraschiv, executive secretary.

International

UN Forces Chief Satisfied With Cooperation

LD2601121292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1140 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 26 (TANJUG)—The chief of the United Nations Military Liaison Officers (UNMLO) in Yugoslavia, Col. John Wilson of Australia, says he is highly satisfied with the cooperation received from his colleagues in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the Croatian army.

In an interview carried today by the Belgrade daily POLITIKA EKSPRES, Col. Wilson explains that the UNMLO's are completely independent and neutral.

He says that this kind of engagement of liaison officers on both sides of the front is unprecedented in U.N. history.

Col. Wilson goes on to say that his presence and impressions will in no way prejudge the U.N. Security Council's decision on whether or not to deploy "blue helmet" troops in Yugoslavia.

He explains that political competences and powers, as well as the duty to make recommentations to U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus Ghali, belong to U.N. Under-Secretary General Marrack Goulding.

Goulding is due to arrive in Belgrade today.

Asked about his talk with the president of the republic of Serb Krajina, Milan Babic, scheduled for Friday, Col. Wilson says that Babic did not say that the U.N. officers were unwelcome nor would that be the case with U.N. peace-keeping troops.

Babic has rejected the plan of U.N. special envoy Cyrus Vance for the deployment of a "blue helmet" force in the territory of the Serb Krajina republic on the ink-blot principle, maintaining that it would not guarantee sufficient protection to the Serbs against a Croatian aggression. He asks that "blue helmets" troops be deployed along the line of separation.

Interrepublic

Dinar Devaluation Increases Foreign Debt

LD2801195292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1510 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 27 (TANJUG)—The latest devaluation of the dinar has increased by five times the sum in dinars which is to be paid for every dollar of Yugoslavia's total foreign debt of 14.5 billion dollars, so that the equivalent in dinars of the one billion 250 million dollars Yugoslavia is to pay this year in debt interest alone will be a heavy burden for the debtors.

National Bank of Yugoslavia director-general for relations with other countries Gavrilo Dedovic told a news conference today that the federal central bank secured the foreign currency for the financial obligations guaranteed by the federation, which he said stood at a total of 900 million dollars for this year.

Dedovic set out that the share of the Slovene and Croatian debtors should be deducted from the total sum, since, under a decision of the Assembly of Yugoslavia, the National Bank of Yugoslavia was no longer obliged to secure foreign currency for their debt payments since the two republics have monetarily broken away from Yugoslavia.

National Bank of Yugoslavia Vice-Governor Branko Dragas said that the country's foreign currency reserves now stood at around 2.9 billion dollars, of which he said the federal bank accounted for 2.4 billion.

The commercial banks of the republics of Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro account for half a billion of the foreign currency reserves.

The commercial banks of the republics of Slovenia and Croatia, themselves, have a half-billion dollars in foreign currency reserves.

National Bank of Yugoslavia Governor Dusan Vlatkovic said that the changing of dinar banknotes from December 25 last year to January 15 this year covered 95 billion dollars (around 120 million dollars calculated on the basis of the dinar's new exchange rate), or 15 billion more than originally planned.

The printing of the new banknotes cost around 644 million dinars (around 10 million marks), according to National Bank of Yugoslavia calculations.

If the republics of Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina decide to introduce their own currencies, as National Bank of Yugoslavia Governor Vlatkovic said, the populations in the two republics will face spiralling inflation, severe shortages, and other consequences.

Vlatkovic set out that Serbia and Montenegro, for their part, would take measures to protect themselves in the light of the negative experiences they have had after the introduction of the Slovene tolar and the Croatian dinar.

Monetary Authorities Countermeasures 'Legal'

LD2401201292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2041 GMT 23 Jan 92

[Text] Sarajevo, Jan 23 (TANJUG)—Governor of the National Bank of Bosnia-Hercegovina Hajra Balorda today said that this republic had control over the primary issue and that the measures of the Belgrade-based Federal monetary authorities were legal and economically justified.

The Federal monetary authorities late last year printed new bills of the Yugoslav dinar to protect the country

from the moves of the secessionist Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia, which had issued their own currencies. Slovenia introduced the tolar in October while Croatia introduced the Croatian dinar in December.

Accusations were heard in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where some have urged the introduction of the republic's own currency, that, by issuing new dinars, the Federal monetary authorities caused the skyrocketting of inflation in this republic. Balorda announced that a huge amount of worthless old dinars entered Bosnia-Hercegovina and caused the spiralling of inflation, but she gave no specific figures.

Some ten days ago, the Yugoslav press wrote that, in late December of last year and the beginning of this year, a large quanitity of old dinars were sent to Bosnia-Hercegovina to be exchanged and "laundered" for new ones. The bills in question were the ones Croatia was supposed to have proclaimed invalid and sent to the National Bank of Yugoslavia when it introduced its own currency.

This money was sent to western Hercegovina, which is mostly populated by Croats and borders with Croatia.

The press assessed that over 350 million dinars (one German mark is officially worth 13 dinars and its value reaches 100 dinars on the black market) were exchanged for the new dinars. The vice-governor of the Bosnia-Hercegovina National Bank Obrad Piljak said at the time that there were no precise facts about the affair but that at least four billion worthless dinars were found in the republic's National Bank after the old dinars were exchanged for new ones.

Justifying the move of the Federal monetary authorities, Balorda said that if the exchange of old dinars for new ones had not taken place, the German mark would have now been worth 500 dinars on the black market.

She also said that the Bosnia-Hercegovina government was not consulted during the money exchange, because the procedure was carried out under the constitution and law on the National Bank of Yugoslavia.

Balorda said that two members of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency and the republic's Prime Minister Jure Pelivan knew of the money exchange. In his talk with her, Pelivan claimed that the new Croatian currency did not pose a threat, but that Bosnia-Hercegovina should be protected from the issuing of new Yugoslav dinars.

Macedonian Bank Governor on Currency Battles

92BA0373B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Dec 91 p 10

[Article by M. Krstic: "Financial Experts in Macedonia Claim That the Macedonian Market Has for Quite Some Time Felt the Surplus of the Dinar Without Coverage"]

[Text] According to the republic's decision, starting today at noon, the Public Auditing Service [SDK] in Skoplje will open places for the exchange of the present 100, 500, and 1,000 dinar bank notes into new denominations in order to prevent possible speculative transactions, and the damaging consequences of the announced inflationary blow by Croatia.

This was said in a statement by the deputy general director of the SDK of Macedonia, Nikola Kacarski, who pointed out that the decision made by the Council of Governors of the National Bank of Yugoslavia will be carried through in its entirety. As Kacarski stated, at this moment the only possible protection of the uncontrolled flooding of the Croatian dinar is the fastest possible exchange of the present monetary denominations of the dinar into new ones, but of different appearance.

The governor of the National Bank of Macedonia, Borko Stanoevski, stated for POLITIKA that at the very start—23 December—responding to the "first signs" of the Croatian inflationary blow, the Macedonian government brought the decision to put the brakes on the transfer of money from Croatia and Slovenia, two Yugoslav republics that introduced their own national currencies. This prominent Macedonian financial expert warned that the Macedonian market has for sometime felt the surplus, without sufficient coverage, of the Yugoslav dinar.

According to estimates of the governor of the National Bank of Macedonia, the latest, urgent measure of exchanging the dinar will not fully protect the economies of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegonina, Montenegro, and Macedonia, since, besides some obstacles, there are numerous "holes" in the circulation of the Yugoslav dinar. Suffice it to say that, for example, a fairly large number of pensioners living outside Croatia whose retirement payments come from Croatian retirement funds will continue receiving their payments in Yugoslav dinars. This is a typical example of the "siphoning" off of dinars invalid in Croatia into other areas of Yugoslavia that have not as yet introduced their own national currencies. According to Governor Stanoevski, this exchange should be, above all, taken as an extraordinary technical measure with which to alleviate the blow of "the inflation transfer from the north," in fact, a protection against the enormous amounts of money that, in essence, circulate without coverage.

The acceptance of the decision of the Council of the Governors of the National Bank of Yugoslavia is first and foremost understood in Skoplje only as an interim solution. Within the Macedonian government, a group of financial experts has been working for quite some time, behind closed doors, and they are expected soon to present to the delegates of the Macedonian parliament their plan for solving the present Macedonian monetary cul-de-sac. Sources say that because of such diverse circumstances in Yugoslavia, this group of experts will bring some solutions that will lead to Macedonian monetary independence. Whether a Macedonian national currency will be introduced soon or whether, instead of

Yugoslav dinars, coupons of the same value will be printed remains the main dilemma of the financial experts who, apparently, are split on the "sequence" of the steps to be undertaken.

If the monetary independence of Macedonia is accepted, the Macedonian state may find itself, at the very first step, in a closed situation due to its own monetary self-isolation. There is the danger of a total breakup of the payment system with some other republics which, as their own means of payment, still use the Yugoslav dinar. Those who oppose the introduction of the Macedonian national currency claim its promotion demands longer preparations, corresponding coverage, and recognition by international financial institutions. On the other hand, the introduction of coupons as "coverage" in money transactions can, in their opinion, be more efficient protection than the present troubling inflation that threatens the country.

Federal

Kostic Says EC Complicating Yugoslav Situation

LD2801194492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1850 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, Jan 28 (TANJUG)—Vice president of the Yugoslav Presidency Branko Kostic said today that, instead of helping, the European Community had only contributed to complicating the situation and conflict in Yugoslavia. At a meeting with a delegation of the Federation of Reserve Officers of the Yugoslav People's Army, Kostic said that the Yugoslav state leadership was committed to seeking a peaceful settlement to the Yugoslav crisis, adding that the invitation to UN peacekeeping troops should be viewed in this context.

Over the past few months, the activity of the Yugoslav Presidency has been directed at preventing a dismembering of Yugoslavia "by some well-organized parties abroad", said Kostic and emphasized that the Presidency would not permit the Yugoslav crisis to be resolved by a policy of fait accompli and pressure.

He went on to say that the Yugoslav Presidency especially insisted on ending the armed conflicts provoked by Slovenia's and Croatia's violent secession from Yugoslavia.

The reserve officers' delegation told Kostic that many members of their federation were committed to preserving a Yugoslavia "within new boundaries", and voiced full support for the Presidency's work and activities.

Expects Decision on UN Troops in Feb

LD2901031892 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0024 GMT 29 Jan 92

["Pool" item]

[Text] Titograd, January 28 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav State Presidency Vice-President Branko Kostic this evening said he expected the decision on the engagement of a U.N. peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia to be taken in February. Kostic added that the U.N. force would remain in Yugoslavia until the finding of a political solution to the crisis.

Kostic was a guest in a live talk show on Montenegro television, together with General Slavko Jovic, the former commander of the U.N. peace-keeping troops on the Iraqi-Iranian border and now an advisor to the Yugoslav Army chief of General Staff.

Kostic said that the Yugoslav Presidency and the Yugoslav Army leadership were both willing find a political solution to problems although, as he said, the Army leadership was deeply affected by the fact that the country's borders are not where they used to be.

Kostic and Jovic said they hoped that the U.N. peacekeeping force would secure peace in crisis regions, prevent the spreading of civil war and ensure full protection of Serbs in Croatia.

They explained that territories in Croatia, where Serbs are in the majority, would be treated as "regions under U.N. protection", meaning they would be neither a part of Yugoslavia nor of Croatia until an adequate political solution was found.

According to Kostic and Jovic, demilitarization in crisis regions, where the U.N. peace-keeping troops would be deployed, meant a dispersion of the Croatian armed formations along with a withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army.

Jovic Expects UN Troop Deployment by February

LD2901000492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1954 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, Feb 28 (TANJUG)—Member of the Yugoslav Presidency and president of the State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations Borisav Jovic said this evening that the U.N. could place on its agenda a deployment of "Blue Helmets" in Yugoslavia in early February.

All problems which stood in the way of the adoption of such a decision have been overcome, including problems of funding, Jovic told journaliats at Belgrade airport on his return from New York.

He said the peacekeeping operation would cost about 300 million dollars, which meant that the U.N. would have to ask its member states for additional contributions.

Jovic discussed in New York with U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus Ghali and his envoy for Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance the realization of the peace plan for Yugoslavia.

Jovic tackled the same topic in Washington with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.

Stressing that all contentious questions had been clarified, Jovic said there was no longer any reason for suspicion about the U.N. peace plan.

"All the necessary prerequisites have been created for the plan to be accepted by those who have not done so thus far," he said.

Vance's plan calls for a deployment of U.N. "Blue Helmets" in the Serb Krajinas inside the administrative borders of the secessionist Yugoslav Republic of Croatia.

The plan has been accepted by the Yugoslav Presidency and the republics of Croatia and Serbia, while the republic of Serb Krajina, where all the fighting took place, has expressed reservations.

Jovic recalled that Krajina's leaders agreed in principle with the deployment of Blue Helmets but feared that "the peacekeeping force would put them in a fait accompli situation—they would be handed over to the Croatian state and placed in a position of not being able to take part in the search for a political solution to the Serb problem in Croatia on an equal footing."

Krajina's authorities say the U.N. force should be positioned on the demarcation line between the warring sides, and are opposed to the disarming of their territorial defence units.

In their talks with U.N. Under-Secretary-General Marrack Goulding, who is currently visiting Yugoslavia, they asked for alterations of Vance's plan and additional guarantees.

Jovic assessed that there was no longer any reason for mistrust regarding the acceptance of the peace plan.

The arrival of the peace-keeping forces, Jovic explained, was aimed at securing peace and political negotiations in which the Serbs will have an equal opportunity to take part in the shaping of a political solution for their future.

For the duration of U.N. protection, Jovic added, political and all other authority in those territories will be executed by the Serbs and other citizens who live therein.

"There is no possibility whatsoever that the Serbs will be tricked or that the Croatian state will seize power," Jovic underscored.

He said that emphasis was on the political solution being reached at the Brussels conference, where all those who are vitally interested in the resolving of this problem will take part, primarily the Serbs of the Krajina regions.

In addition to a satisfactory examination of the peace plan, Jovic assesed, "we have taken one step further—that the Security Council resolution clearly state that this peace-keeping operation will protect Serbs from aggression and that it is not a political solution, but is aimed solely at providing protection."

"It is up to us alone to decide if we shall take the road of peace in resolving the Yugoslav crisis or if we shall commit an historical error and turn to further war which cannot resolve the crisis," Jovic underscored.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Tension at Neum; JNA Soldiers Killed in Minefield

LD2801222292 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Report by Blasko Ragus, for the "Chronicle of the Day" program]

[Excerpt] The tension in Neum municipality has not eased today. As the public has been informed, last night the enemy's special groups penetrated about 8 km into the territory of Neum municipality and opened fire on the positions held by regular and reserve staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Hercegovina-Bosnia. The enemy's attempt to win the tactically important mount of (Vjetrenik) was fatal for them because they lost several soldiers, whereas on the Ministry of Internal Affairs side only one person was lightly wounded. The enemy today also used mortars, the shells falling on the territory of the local community of Vutovo.

On the adjacent battlefield, near the Peljasac peninsula in the direction of Ston, enemy reservists who recently were exchanged on a part of this battlefield stumbled onto mine fields. Several of them were killed. [passage omitted]

Parliament Session Begins; Arguments Over Agenda

LD2401210392 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1804 GMT 24 Jan 92

[Text] Sarajevo, January 24 (TANJUG)—A session of the parliament of the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina on the calling of a referendum on the republic's sovereignty began with a quarrel over the agenda, which is not just a procedural issue.

The deputies of the three national parties in the ruling coalition could not agree whether the referendum would be of citizens or nations.

The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) deputies protested that the agenda included a debate on "the referendum of citizens on the sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina" and not a debate on the "referendum of nations," which is what they insist on.

The Serbian deputies in the Bosnia-Hercegovina parliament today said that the Serbian people is against decisions which would separate it from Yugoslavia, but

added that Serbs would accept the "independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina only if it is linked to the rest of Yugoslavia."

Bosnia-Hercegovina is one of the four Yugoslav republics which requested international recognition from the European Community, but did not receive it. The request was sent by the Moslem-Croatian coalition in the republican organs of power, without the approval of the representatives of the Serbian people.

The tripartite coalition in Bosnia-Hercegovina is made up of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which rallies Moslems, the SDS and the Croatian Democratic Union (HZD), which rallies Croats. Moslems account for 43.77 percent of Bosnia-Hercegovina's population, Serbs for 31.46 percent and Croats for 17.34 percent.

The Croatian deputies asked that their proposal—that the parliament decide on the withdrawal of all Bosnia-Hercegovina representatives from Yugoslav Federal organs—be included in today's agenda.

The Croatian deputies also asked for the replacement of the governor of the republican National Bank, a Moslem, and the appointment of their candidate.

The Serbian deputies were opposed to subsequent amendments to the agenda.

The Bosnia-Hercegovina parliament session, which is attended by European monitors, continues.

Assembly Head Warns of Independence

LD2601140292 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1316 GMT 26 Jan 92

[Text] Sarajevo, Jan 26 (TANJUG)—President of the Bosnia-Hercegovina parliament Momcilo Krajisnik says that a proclamation of independence of this Yugoslav republic would be "the greatest risk it has taken since World War Two." In an interview published in the Sarajevo daily OSLOBODJENJE today, Krajisnik says that it would be disastrous for Bosnia-Hercegovina if it were to confine itself to within its own borders.

Krajisnik, a Serb, also says he has understanding for Moselms who do not want to live "in a Orthodox Christian Bosnia-Hercegovina." Serbs are Orthodox Christians. I expect that Moslems will also see that Serbs do not want to risk living in a republic which may resemble or become an Islamic state, says Krajisnik. In his opinion, it would disastrous economically if the central Yugoslav republic were to become an independent state with a limited market.

The population of ethnically-mixed Bosnia-Hercegovina is 31 per cent Serb, 17 per cent Croat and 44 per cent Moslem.

Late last year, the republican presidency and government sought international recognition for Bosnia-Hercegovina without the consent of the Serb members of these bodies. Serbs, who wish to remain in Yugoslavia, have opposed the move. Under the republican constitution, decision of vital importance to the future of Bosnia-Hercegovina may only be taken by consensus of its three constituent nations.

Bosnian Croats To Boycott Referendum

AU2801155992 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] The Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Hercegovina has set several conditions and therefore the Croats will not take part in the referendum [29 February, 1 March]. Like the Serbian Democratic Party, the Croatian Democratic Community demands the institutionalization of the national question. Ljubomir Nikolic reports:

[Nikolic] In the absence of Stjepan Kljujic, Ivan Markesic, member of the top leadership of the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Hercegovina, presented the stand of this party that the referendum represents a chance for yet another Croat state that will be a Serbian and Muslim state at the same time. We are in favor of an independent and sovereign Bosnia-Hercegovina, but hold the view that discussions on its internal organization should be continued, Markesic said.

However, the Croatian Democratic Community will ask the Croats living in Bosnia-Hercegovina not to participate in the referendum unless several conditions are met by the time the referendum is held. According to Markesic, one should provide international supervision, carry out the institutionalization of the Croatian question, the Croatian people must have guarantees for their sovereignty, regardless of the percentage of Croats in the total population of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The authorities should then take a stand regarding their own currency, the Yugoslav People's Army, the army of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the media.

The Croatian Democratic Community holds the view that only the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina should be allowed to vote in the referendum, and not refugees, reservists, soldiers and their officers, and members of the families who came to Bosnia-Hercegovina from Croatia and Slovenia. According to the Croatian Democratic Community, our citizens working abroad should be able to vote in its places of abode.

Ivan Markesic expressed the belief that it would nevertheless be possible to meet the conditions set by the Croatian Democratic Community by 29 February. He announced the imminent founding of the Croatian political communities of (?Vrbosta), those in the Bihac, Tuzla, and Banja Luka regions.

Mariofil Ljubic, vice president of the republican assembly, assessed as historic the decisions of deputies of

the Croatian Democratic Community and Party of Democratic Action on the referendum and the withdrawal of all representatives of Bosnia- Hercegovina from the federal organs.

Hajra Balorda [governor of the National Bank of Bosnia-Hercegovina] was criticized for having committed treason because she agreed to replace the old dinars. The consequence of this act was high inflation that could lead to great social unrest in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Muslim Group Considers Referendum Unnecessary

LD2501152192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1047 GMT 23 Jan 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—The Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] believes the referendum on the state and legal status of Bosnia-Hercegovina is not necessary from the point of view of internal relations in Bosnia-Hercegovina because the positions of the main political forces on this issue are well known and they have been expressed in the republican parliament. A referendum, however, makes some sense only if it is a necessary step in Bosnia- Hercegovina's request for recognition in international relations, in accordance with the requests by the European Community.

In this respect, the MBO believes the only possible question that should be asked is: "Are you in favor of a sovereign state of Bosnia-Hercegovina?" Any other question, in the opinion of this party, should not be asked because it is not necessary and it can lead to confusion and unnecessary opposition in both the political sphere and among citizens.

In connection with tomorrow's session of the republican assembly, the MBO believes the assembly should determine its position in relation to the current political situation and the situation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, where none of its vital segments is functioning and which has incurred incalculable negative consequences for all of society.

Earlier examples of clearly political terror over the inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina include interference with communications, freedom of ownership, freedom of expression, and the exercising of political rights, as well as the exposure of the inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina to direct acts of violence through illegal mobilizations, arrests, accusations, murders, and robberies. An MBO statement stresses that direct political terror appeared in Bosnia- Hercegovina in the form of murders, kidnapping, etc.

The main cause of these phenomena are, in MBO's opinion, the existence of parallel authorities in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the actions of the Army, carried out without the consent of the people and the Bosnia-Hercegovina Government and against the will and interests of the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Therefore, the MBO is requesting that the core of the issue of the immediate withdrawal of the Army from Bosnia-Hercegovina and the limiting of its activity to the standards and frameworks of peacetime relations—with the full respect of the authorities of Bosnia-Hercegovina—be immediately discussed in the republican parliament.

Croatia

UN's Goulding Arrives in Zagreb, Meets Tudjman

Goulding, Tudjman Admit 'Differences'

LD2801235892 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2300 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Following his two-hour resumed talks tonight with Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tudjman, Marrack Goulding, the UN secretary general's secretary for political affairs, told journalists that he would rather not talk in any great detail about the issues under discussion. He added that there are differences in interpretation which have to be resolved before the UN plan is implemented, and that several other topics were brought up during the meeting. He also stressed that he must talk with others to find out what their views are now. For this reason he will travel to Belgrade today and subsequently to New York where he will report to the UN secretary general.

In his statement to journalists, Dr Franjo Tudjman said that he did not have anything to add to what Marrack Goulding said. He stressed that the well-known Croatian stands were explained concerning the use of peacekeeping forces on Croatian soil. We want to see an end to the occupation of Croatian territories by the aggressor army. We want the departure of the Yugoslav Army, the disarmament of irregular forces, and the establishment of the constitutional and legal system of the republic of Croatia with local self-administration guarantees, Dr Tudjman said in conclusion.

Press Briefing Detailed

LD2801180492 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Report on news conference by UN envoy Marrack Goulding by correspondent Mladen Hrgarek in Zagreb on 28 January; recorded—Goulding speaks in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation]

[Text] [Goulding] I had a very complete discussion over two and a half hours with President Tudjman and his colleagues about the plan for deployment of UN forces in Yugoslavia. We talked about the progress we had made by removing obstacles in the path of implementing agreements. Some issues still remain on which we did not reach complete agreement. We will meet again late tonight after a pause for both parties to think about what was said at this morning's meeting.

[Hrgarek] Asked what he thought about the implementation of the plan agreed upon at yesterday's talks with

representatives of so-called Krajina and today's talks with President Tudjman, Marrack Goulding said:

[Goulding] What I would like to say first is that one of the conditions which has always been there for the deployment of the UN force in Yugoslavia, namely a stable, a reasonably stable cease-fire, has now been fulfilled. There are violations of the cease-fire, daily violations, and sadly people are still dying. But the situation is very much better than it was a few weeks or a few months ago. Most of the alleged cease-fire violations are comparatively minor. My own judgement, but it is for the secretary general to decide, is that as far as the cease-fire is concerned conditions exist for the deployment of the UN peace-keeping force in Yugoslavia. But, there are other conditions which have to be fulfilled, and those conditions, or that condition, is that all those concerned should accept the plan and should be ready to cooperate with the UN personnel who will come out to implement the plan. It is a long a detailed plan and there are one or two points on both sides, which, about which those concerned still have reservations. That is what we are working on now, what we were working on in Belgrade the day before yesterday, in Knin yesterday, and now in Zageb today.

[Hrgarek] Asked if he thought it was possible to solve the present problems, Goulding replied:

[Goulding] I hope so, we really have to solve them, because there is a tremendously strong feeling in New York and I think elsewhere in the world and in Yugoslavia that it is most important to remove the remaining obstacles. Thank you.

SAR's Hadzic Meets Goulding, Reviews Situation

LD2701121492 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1103 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Belgrade, 27 Jan (TANJUG)—Goran Hadzic, prime minister of the government of the Serbian Autonomous Region [SAR] of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, met UN Under-Secretary Marrack Goulding, in charge of UN peacekeeping operations, today in the Palace of the Federation in Belgrade. Apart from Hadzic's aides, the following UN officials took part in the talks: Colonel Heikki Purola [as received], UN special military adviser; Shashi Tharoor [as received], UN special political adviser; and Colonel John Wilson, head of the UN liaison team.

Following the two-hour talks held behind closed doors, Goulding told TANJUG and Belgrade Television that his meeting with Hadzic was very useful. "I told Mr. Hadzic that I have come under the instructions of the UN secretary general in order to hear what his concerns are and what his people are concerned about regarding the UN peace plan. We have talked about this, and I understand their concern," Goulding said and added "I think that some reasons for the concern can be removed." He stressed "I am satisfied more than before in these talks with the readiness of the people represented by Mr. Hadzic to cooperate with UN peacekeeping forces."

"I think it could be said that a move forward has been made," Goulding assessed and added "these talks brought about progress." There are still obstacles which need to be considered, he continued, repeating that he was "encouraged by today's talks." Goulding then announced that immediately after talks with Hadzic he was going to Knin for talks with Milan Babic, president of the recently proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina. Goulding expressed the conviction that further progress would be made there. After Knin, UN Under-Secretary Goulding, as he said at the end, will go to Zagreb "where progress must be also made."

"I am partially satisfied with talks," Goran Hadzic said and added: "we have more or less reached an agreement and we have mainly accepted the plan. We have suggested our changes and I think that the secretary general will take them into account. We have also expressed the wish that the blue helmets finally arrive and establish peace." Advocating that the Serbian people in Croatia decides with whom it wants to live, Hadzic refused to dwell on his proposed changes to the peace plan. "Some problems we see as basic, and gentlemen from the United Nations do not see them as big problems but just as technical problems. Nevertheless, we expect a positive resolution of the crisis. I, personally, finally see some reason for optimism," Hadzic said.

Asked whether talks with Goulding touched upon the issue of additional guarantees, Hadzic gave a positive reply specifying that "additional guarantees will be given in a special UN resolution." The talks also discussed, as he put it, details of the blueprint for the arrival of the blue helmets and "we have explained and clarified some issues." Hadzic said that Goulding reacted "in a tolerant way" to his proposals and "I think he will accept them. I expect that Goulding will also find a common ground with Babic in Knin," Goran Hadzic concluded.

SAR Rejects UN Troops in Croatia

LD2801195192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1752 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Erdut, 28 Jan (TANJUG)—The government of the Serbian Region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem today examined a report by Prime Minister Goran Hadzic on yesterday's talks in Belgrade with Marrick Goulding, under secretary of the UN secretary general, Deputy Information Minister Rade Leskovac has stated.

According to him, their attention was focused on the places of deployment of the UN peacekeeping forces according to Cyrus Vance's plan. That primarily refers to the point of the agreement saying that the peacekeeping forces are to be deployed on the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

The government of this Serbian region, the statement says, does not accept such an option, because it prejudges a political solution. The government opposes all solutions which would put the territory of Knin Krajina and other Serbian areas within Croatian borders. Troops of the UN peacekeeping forces can come, not to be deployed on the territory of the Republic of Croatia, but on the territory of Yugoslavia, because Serbian Krajinas expressed their will to remain in Yugoslavia, not in Croatia.

The government of the Serbian region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem called on Goulding to ask the UN to issue written guarantees which would confirm the present situation in this Serbian region and which would set out that the peacekeeping forces can be deployed along the line of separation of warring sides, and to particularly emphasize on the territory of Yugoslavia.

It was stated that the government of the region has launched an initiative for a meeting to be organized as soon as possible between representatives of all Serbian Krajinas and regions with representatives of the Serbian and Montenegrin governments in order to reach an agreement on the future of Yugoslavia, particularly that of the Serbian people.

Separovic Favors Rapid, Limited UN Deployment

LD2801175292 Hamburg DPA in German 1648 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Frankfurt (DPA)—Zagreb's Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic has spoken in favor of a rapid, but limited, stationing of UN peacekeeping troops in the war zones of Croatia. In an interview for Wednesday's edition of the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, the Croatian Foreign Minister said that the "Blue Helmets", which according to the UN plan were to be stationed at the same time as the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army, should not remain in the country for longer than one year. A more long-term deployment, like the one Serbia was striving for, would encourage the splitting off of the Croatian areas which were currently occupied, which Croatia would not accept. Zagreb would not consider substantial changes to the borders, at most, only structurally related "minor changes" would be considered.

The Zagreb Foreign Minister said "complete recognition by the United Nations "was the main aim of Croatian foreign policy following the current wave of recognition. Separovic soon expects a change in the position of the United States, which still has reservations. Russia [word indistinct] then follow which would make a Chinese veto in the Security Council unlikely.

Prime Minister Returns, Details UN Talks

LD2601120692 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 92

[Text] Croatian Prime Minister Dr. Franjo Greguric has returned from New York, where he met with UN Secretary General Butrus Ghali and his special envoy Cyrus Vance. At today's news conference he gave his impressions of the talks in New York and, among other things, said:

[Begin Greguric recording] The general assessment after all the talks—primarily with ambassadors—is that they fully understand and support the desire to dispatch peacekeeping forces to this areas as soon as possible as a basis for the preservation of this fragile peace that has held on for three weeks but which could, unfortunately, be broken if it is not strengthened in the way envisaged by the plan to send peacekeeping forces to this area; as it is envisaged by the plan to disarm and introduce civilian authority in the areas that are now occupied; and as it is envisaged to deploy peacekeeping forces along the border with Bosnia-Hercegovina, including the Bihac-Banja Luka front, which is also, I would say, (?turbulent) and linked with the Army's activity.

It also emerged from these talks with the ambassadors that they support the dispatch of the units, and they also support the request for membership in the United nations that the Croatian Government will soon submit. And the third thing that is also very important, and about which we expressed our stand: we are in favor of the continuation of the peace-conference on Yugoslavia, at which the issue of the Yugoslav legacy, and everything else that goes with it, should be finally resolved.

The united stand of the ambassadors, and later of Mr. Butrus Ghali, is that these issues should be resolved within the region—in Europe—which means at the peace-conference. The United Nations should deal with the problem of the dispatch of UN forces as a basis for the establishment of peace in this area.

The talks with Mr. Butrus Ghali were also in the same spirit with our stands on establishing a permanent peace. I think it is perfectly clear that this should be done as soon as possible. Our request is that 1,500 to 2,000 soldiers be sent to this area immediately, within the next ten days, and after that, in a period of two weeks, the Army units should withdraw and their defense centers in the areas in which the UN forces enter be disarmed. We even suggested what this should look like, where it should start. This will be discussed with Mr. (?Goulding) probably on Sunday or Monday. He will spend a few days in Belgrade, Bosnia, and here with us in order to agree on these final details. [end recording]

Cease-Fire Violations in Zadar Area Increase

LD2801161492 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Excerpt] In an attack last night on the area of Zemunik Donji, when the enemy army fired around 10 mortar shells from the Chetnik stronghold Zemunik Gornji toward Croatian army positions, two Croatian soldiers were killed and one was seriously injured. Toni Pajkin reports:

Last night's violation of the cease-fire in the hinterland of Zadar was one of the worst since the latest cease-fire

agreement came into force. Violations of this cease-fire have become increasingly blatant over the past few days. A further escalation of the occupier's violence can be expected.

Over the past 25 days of truce, the enemy has created provocations every day, sometimes even using heavy artillery. During these attacks, 13 persons were killed; 12 of them were members of the Croatian Army, and 1 was a civilian; 3 members of the Croatian Army were killed after being captured; 18 persons were seriously wounded, and 20 persons sustained light injuries.

The Serbian Army continued with its barbarism today. This morning a church in occupied Skabrnja was completely destroyed, and from there the enemy opened small-arms fire toward our positions. Around noon, the heavy machine-gun fire coming from the hill of Kriz, where the enemy is stationed and controls a part of the Adriatic Highway, was targeted on [word indistinct].

The command of the Zadar sector defense has no details on any further casualties the Croatian Army and civilians may have suffered in the provocations today. [passage omitted]

Progress Made in Vinkovci Cease-Fire Meeting

LD2801213692 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2013 GMT 28 Jan 92

[Text] Vinkovci, 28 Jan (TANJUG)—The eighth meeting of the commission monitoring the cease-fire has taken place in the Slavonia Hotel in Vinkovci, in the presence of European observers. In addition to the traditional agenda, in which cease-fire violation problems are discussed and the minutes of preceding meetings approved, a significant agreement was attained today to the effect that a third wire "hot line" be established by 1200 tomorrow on the most sensitive section of the front line, between Ceric and Nustar. This will be another step forward in more effectively preventing and curbing incidents.

The statement issued by the information service of the Yugoslav People's Army command taking part in the talks says that, apart from everything else, a joint stance was adopted at the end of the meeting, holding that important results have been achieved in this sector of the front line between the Danube, Vuka, and Sava rivers in an effort to comply with the cease-fire as efficiently as possible, and that conditions and a sound basis already have been established not only for the arrival of "Blue Helmets," but for political dialogue at a higher level during which the final and most unbiased solution of the Yugoslav crisis can be attained.

'Massacre' Reported in Plitvice Region

LD2501144892 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 24 Jan 92

[Text] Out of about 4,000 Croatians who used to live in Titova Korenica, only about 50 are left. After burning down the villages of Canak, Podlapaca, Vagan, Rastovac, and (?Smoljanac), the village of Poljanak was also burned down. In this village and in the village of Lisina, [Krajina Interior Minister] Martic's Chetniks killed 11 villagers on 7 October. Their bodies have not yet been buried.

It is feared that this was not the only massacre in the Plitvice region. We have learned from unofficial sources that another 50 people were bestially killed. This has been learned from survivors and refugees.

In Glina municipality, the enemy has killed 52 Croatian civilians since last June. In the occupied territories of Glina, only 75 Croatians are left. It is not known what has happened to them. According to a republican government commission, the majority have been imprisoned in Glina jail, a well-known torture place. In 37 villages in which Croatians were living before the occupation, just over 100 weak old people, who are daily tortured by Glina's occupying authorities, have been left without food or medicine. EC observers were informed about the trials of the Croatians in Glina. The EC observers were also asked to pass the information to the International Red Cross, the EC, UNESCO, and the United Nations.

DANAS Assesses Leaders' Popularity

92BA0360B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 31 Dec 91 pp 12, 14

[Unattributed article: "The Public Likes Generals"]

[Text] Which of the political figures on the Croatian political scene would you choose as the personality of the year, that is, which politician has in your opinion had the most influence on political events in Croatia during 1991 in the positive sense and also in the negative sense? This question was composed as a question of what is called the open-ended type, in that the respondents were left an opportunity to enter on the questionnaire themselves the name of the politician whose activity had marked the past year. In answering the question phrased that way, 32 percent of the respondents wrote in the name of President Franjo Tudjman, and that under the heading of "The personality of the year in a positive sense." At the same time, the personality of the year in the negative sense received a higher percentage. All of 45 percent of the negative votes, the number received by the Serbian president. Tudjman as the constructive figure and Milosevic as the negative figure, that is the most important research finding, although anticipated, of DANAS' research team, which ended its second year of successfully taking the pulse of Croatia's political public with its project of surveying public opinion on the most important figures and events of the year.

The "list of constructive figures" showed very low dispersion, which means that public opinion is not homogeneous about who has been the number one person in Croatia during the past year. Tudjman's first-place showing is to be explained by the time when the survey

was done. That is, this survey coincided in time with international recognition of Croatia's statehood, which is an event that marked the end of the year in a dominant way and certainly improved Tudjman's rating. After all, with the fall of Vukovar and all the events that accompanied it (the arrest of Paraga and Dedakovic), the Croatian political public was seriously doubtful about the authority of the new Croatian government, which until that point had been indisputable. But international recognition of Croatia's independence inevitably restores confidence in the correctness of the president's policy, but a critical attitude toward him still exists, as shown by the datum that Tudjman is the only politician who is on both lists, both the constructive figures and the negative figures.

Constructive Figures	Percentage	Negative Figures	Percentage
Franjo Tudjman	32	Slobodan Milosevic	45
Anton Tus	17	Veljko Kadijevic	21
Savka Dabcevic-Kucar	15	Ante Markovic	11
Stipe Mesic	9	Others (JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], generals, etc.)	6
Zvonimir Separovic	7	Milan Babic	5
Dobroslav Paraga	6	Jovan Raskovic	4
Franjo Greguric	5	Franjo Tudjman	4
Martin Spegelj	3	Alija Izetbegovic	1
Branimir Glavas	2	Others (politicians)	3
Others	4		
	100		100

As confirmation of the thesis that Croatia's international recognition has stabilized Tudjman's authority, we submit that our respondents chose recognition of Croatia's statehood as the event of the year. All of 97 percent feel that this is the event which greatly influenced political conditions in Croatia, 2 percent felt that its influence was moderate, and only 1 percent thought that recognition of Croatia's independence had negligible influence on political conditions in the republic.

Corps General Anton Tus' second-place showing is a reflection of the momentary situation of a state at war. The perception of Tus in Croatia's public opinion is to some extent like the Schwarzkopf phenomenon in the United States. After all, the public of a country at war simply likes successful generals. It is a warranted assumption that professional soldiers will sink into the anonymity of the military calling under peacetime conditions.

Savka's 15 percent and Paraga's 6 percent are a hint of democratic and pluralistic Croatia after the war. The dilemma over whether Tudjman or Mesic is first, which has been evident in almost all DANAS' surveys of public opinion during 1991, has finally been resolved. It is true that at the time when he was president of the Presidency of the dying SFRY Stipe Mesic, with his particular image and witty public statements, simply captured the sympathies of the public. It is also indisputable that with Mesic's departure to another political office, also a high one (political secretary of the ruling party), the Croatian state is losing an important political talent.

The ranking of figures on the "negative list" was mainly anticipated. Milosevic's and Kadijevic's showing is no surprise at all, but Ante Markovic is a politician who had a certain amount of credit with the Croatian public back at the beginning of the year. The disproportion between the number of negative points for Babic and Raskovic, leaders of the Knin rebellion, and the high percentages of Milosevic and Kadijevic show that the Croatian public correctly perceives the role of those who are the sponsors, those who give the orders, and those who carry out the operations of the war in Croatia. It is interesting that the respondents quite often, a total of 9 percent, used collective nouns on the list of negative figures, such as the JNA, the generals, the rebels, the "log revolutionaries," and so on. Unfortunately, the name of the Serbian people was also given in a certain number of cases.

Degree of Influence on the Political Situation (in percentage)

Events in 1991	High	Moderate	Negligible
Croatia's international recognition	97	2	1
Decision on withdrawal of JNA from Croatia	83	13	4
Fall of Vukovar	76	12	12
Proclamation of Croatia independent and sovereign	75	12	13
Attack on Dubrovnik	72	22	6

Degree of Influence on the Political Situation (in percentage) (Continued)

Events in 1991	High	Moderate	Negligible
Refugees from wartorn areas	71	26	3
Open intervention of JNA in Croatia	68	29	3
Blockade of JNA garrisons in Croatia	68	20	12
Occupation of Baranja by JNA	59	32	9
January communique of SSNO [Federal Secretariat for National Defense]	57	29	14
Naval blockade of Adriatic ports	53	27	20
Ban on political activity in Croatian Army	52	11	37
Action of MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] in Borovo Selo	39	36	25
Arrest of Paraga and Dedakovic	37	31	32
Establishment of SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Western Slavonia	35	24	41
Failure to elect S. Mesic president	31	25	44
War in Slovenia	25	49	26
Intervention of MUP at Plitvice	24	58	18
Trial of Virovitica people	24	29	47
Election of Stipe Mesic president	24	31	45
Ante Paradzik's murder	22	39	39
Moratorium on decisions of Assembly of Republic of Croatia	21	25	54
Conference on Yugoslavia in The Hague	19	29	52
Secession of SAO Krajina	12	11	77
Annexation of SAO Krajina to Serbia	5	7	88
14 truces signed	5	7	88
Meetings of the presidents of Yugoslav republics	2	6	92

[Box, p 14]

The Sample

In a state that has been struck by war it is impossible to organize field research (poll-taking) in strict observance of each and every rule of the profession. The essential postulates of professionalism were not departed from even in this DANAS project. A stratified quota sample of 892 respondents was used as representative of Croatia's adult population.

Wartime conditions (mobilization, the flight of refugees, etc.) have essentially disrupted the demographic structure of the country in that respondents from those areas which are occupied or directly affected by military operations could not be part of our sample. We have tried to make up this deficiency by conducting a survey among those who have been driven out of those areas.

The sample included 107 adults who are refugees at the moment, and their number is in approximate proportion to the number of refugees in the total Croatian population and also the share of the regions from which they fled in the distribution of the population. The other sociodemographic characteristics of the sample were respected, so that we have 44 percent of the respondents with elementary schooling, 41 with secondary, and 15 percent with junior or senior postsecondary schooling. Of the 892 participants in the survey, 412 were men and 480 were women. The quality of the sample with respect to the ethnic composition of the Croatian population corresponds to the actual pattern of ethnic representation. The sample consisted of 79 percent Croats, 10 percent Serbs, and the other 11 percent are members of minority ethnic groups or are ethnically uncommitted or declare themselves to be Yugoslavs. The survey was conducted in the second half of December in greater Zagreb, where the refugees were also surveyed, and then in Varazdin, Rijeka, Pula, Krapina, and Kutina.

Initiative Launched To Establish Nuclear Society

LD2401232692 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0830 GMT 23 Jan 92

[Text] A group of experts on nuclear science and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes has launched an initiative to set up the Croatian Nuclear Society. The society's activites would be designed to develop know-how for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes

and to encourage an exchange of information and communication with the public. The Croatian Nuclear Society would also dedicate its efforts to education and training in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, to the creation of a bibliography and records on nuclear energy, and to drafting legal and technical regulations. The society will organize meetings of experts and develop cooperation with similar organizations at home and abroad. It will also develop the vocabulary of Croatian terminology on nuclear energy, inform the public about the nature of nuclear energy, and develop publishing activity. The constitutive assembly of the Croatian Nuclear Society is expected to be held at the end of the first quarter of the current year.

Croatian Party Leader Paraga Attacks Tudjman

92BA0375A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Jan 92 p 14

[Interview with Dobroslav Paraga, president of the Croatian Rights Party, by Seada Vranic and Sanja Modric; place and date not given: "The People Themselves Will Destroy Tudjman"—first paragraph is BORBA introduction]

[Text] Tudjman thinks of himself as God's gift to man, a Roman pope, and probably holds that he is a descendant of the apostles Peter and Paul, and he writes epistles. Open the Gospels, and in a thousand years of history the epistles can be counted on the fingers of one hand, but Tudjman writes them every two weeks.

BORBA's subject, Dobroslav Paraga, president of the Croatian Rights Party, is at the moment one of the most provocative journalistic challenges. The reason is his recent arrest under the charge that he was conspiring against constitutional order in Croatia and the ruling team of Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and then his release from detention under a reduced charge (weapons smuggling), but also much of what preceded the act of arrest, because of which Paraga and his party have found themselves on the pages of the most read newspapers of the world.

The leader of the "rights people" is also known to the public from the more distant past, as a prisoner of the former regime, in whose fate "Amnesty International," many prominent American congressmen and donators, and well-known European intellectuals and politicians were interested. At the age of 30, Paraga has more than five years of prison "service," with a short relapse of imprisonment in the "young, democratic state of Croatia."

In any case, Paraga provokes polarized views. For some he's a democrat, a fighter for human rights and a patriot, while others see him as a defender of and successor to a fascist ideology, the leader of the extreme paramilitary unit HOS [Croatian Defense Force] which, 20 days before Paraga's arrest, Croatian authorities condemned as extremist and criminal. The insignia "U" on the uniforms of his military volunteers and the well-known slogan "Ready for the Homeland" induced some European analysts to recognize the spirit of fascism in the HOS, the party that is his political promoter; this was used in an attempt at a "domestic" settling of accounts with the "rights people" and their leader.

In a two-hour conversation—which was unexpectedly interrupted after one hour by the arrival at the party seat of the commander of the defense of Vukovar, Mile Dedakovic-Jastreb, just released from detention—Paraga answered all questions asked without hesitation, acting self-confident and calm, revealing himself to be an educated and refined, as well as very well informed, subject. He showed that he knew about the case where BORBA's reporters were thrown out of their correspondents office in Zagreb ("That depicts the ruling regime best"), and added what a shame it is that BORBA no longer reaches Zagreb, whose ruling clique, says Paraga, has obviously been seized by paranoia from every different opinion.

Stepping on Human Rights

At the beginning of the interview Paraga draws a parallel between his last arrest and the one that occurred some 10 years ago.

"Both then and now I felt that, with the curtailment of my freedom, an injustice was being done to me, that my human rights were being trampled on, but this recent arrest was more difficult for me because Croatia is now a multiparty country. But, everything has remained the same in the nature of the regime. Both then and now—I bother the authorities. This government does not tolerate criticism either, and the fabrication of an indictment indicates identical methods," claims Paraga.

[BORBA] Nevertheless, the public was agitated about your arrest this time. And your political adversaries publicly protested the actions against you.

[Paraga] That's something that encourages me, and the government would have to think about such reactions from the public. To that extent it was much easier for me in detention this time than 10 years ago. In addition, my arrest was played out as if on film. Manolic (director of the Office for the Protection of Constitutional Order—editor's note) showed himself to be a big gangster, I don't have another word for his actions. He staged the attack upon my departure from my settlement for Maksimir.

[BORBA] You were arrested as a conspirator against constitutional order, and your jailing was preceded by a report from the ministries of defense and the police in which the HOS is accused of 300 serious criminal acts, and your party of neo-fascism. You left jail "only for weapons smuggling" as the sole remaining charge.

[Paraga] The HOS has been charged with robbery, murder, theft of weapons. Of the 300 incidents cited by the two ministries, the whole story is reduced to two criminal acts for which Bosko Ladeka is charged, against whom not even an indictment has been handed down yet

after a whole two months. I will remind you of that famous path: first two ministries declare a sharp attack on the HOS and my party, and at the hour when Vukovar fell, a meeting is held of the powerful Supreme State Council which speaks slanderously about the conspiracy that led to Jastreb's and my arrest. The charges against me culminated with the report of the State Commission and the epistle of Generalissimo Tudjman, who is both the main actor in my arrest and the party who gave the order for my imprisonment. In less than a month, from a conspirator and an agent of the KOS [Counter-Intelligence Service], who wants to destroy the government of Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb, in the end all that was left was that I was present when money was handed over for the procurement of weapons for the TO [Territorial Defense] and the police in Krizevci. I mention that the Supreme Court, which rejected the most serious incriminations of me, did not even know at that time of the statement of the president of Krizevci district, which clarifies the whole situation. Otherwise, an indictment has not even been handed down against me. And the plan, under which the party and I were to be liquidated, was to be carried out even at the cost of civil war in Croatia.

Specially Trained Fighters

[BORBA] Isn't this claim about civil war exaggerated, nevertheless?

[Paraga] I'm afraid not. Members of my party, as well as our volunteers at the front, were very infuriated by my arrest, and I could not control that mood from jail. These people believe in us without reservation and, indeed, could have done anything in one moment. They know about everything that our party did in the field to protect the lives of fighters, to save villages and citizens. They know that many owe their lives to the fact that we obtained weapons and equipment for them, and trained them in special camps, so they didn't go to war like sheep to the slaughter. Our fighters know that we neither philosophized nor vacillated, like the Croatian government, which to this day has not declared war, or recognized that Croatia is under occupation. With the charges against the HOS and with my arrest, Tudjman deeply offended Croatian pride, as he did, moreover, with the persecution of Dedakovic. He showed that he's an ordinary dictator and that he has no idea what democracy is. He seeks satisfaction by force for his erroneous policy, and I was supposed to be guilty and sacrificed for the fall of Vukovar. Perhaps he will seek the resignation of the president of the Supreme Court for the collapse of his public prosecutor, Zeljko Olujic, instead of replacing his marionette who was once, unfortunately, my defender.

[BORBA] That means, former defender, and current persecutor?

[Paraga] I didn't know in time that Olujic wants only power for which he would sell his own brother. He obviously wanted that power 10 years ago and made a pact with it. Perhaps I got five years at hard labor on Goli island just because of him. He is going so decisively against all the facts in a procedure that the president of the Republic initiated, that it is proof of complete submissiveness to the current government.

[BORBA] Let's return to the present. Today Dedakovic is also leaving jail, and we hear that he will come right to you, to the seat of the HSP [Croatian Rights Party]. How well do you know each other and what are your connections really like that the government considers conspiratorial?

[Paraga] I didn't know Colonel Dedakovic before, but during the siege of Vukovar I spoke with him many times by telephone. We also met when I, touring the front, stayed in Vinkovci. In contrast with other staffs, which I also visited, I noticed that Dedakovic really knows his business. While we talked, he was constantly receiving information from various parts of the front, issuing orders immediately, coordinating actions and, all in all, he reminded me, the way he was bent over his maps, of Kasparov, who makes sure moves on a chessboard. He acted bravely and self-confidently, as a soldier and a professional who knows exactly what he's doing. I believe that, without Jastreb—there would not have been a Vukovar as early as the eighth month. He performed a miracle with his shortage of ammunition, equipment, and even fighters. The HOS was the strongest force in Vukovar, and 150 of our fighters—whom he considered brave and devoted—left their bones there. One alone returned, and his mobilization list best refutes the stories of Franjo Tudjman....

[BORBA] Can you show us that summons to the front?

[Paraga] Look, the summons was sent by the authorized district organ, with a stamp and signature, and that man, Dragan Mandic, a Serb by the way, was summoned to report—to a HOS unit. Therefore, Tudjman condemns us for being illegal and paramilitary units that want to destroy him, but in the field the HOS is treated as a regular formation of the Croatian defense. The HOS will not destroy Tudjman, the Croatian people themselves will.

The HOS Is a Regular Army

[BORBA] What, therefore, is the HOS?

[Paraga] We mobilized our membership at a time when the order of the Croatian people was threatened; we have always valued this, as a rebellious party, throughout history. The new beginning of the HOS occurred at a time when we sent 300 of our volunteers to the gulf war, wanting assistance, but also to point out that the occupation of Kuwait was possible because the occupations of small nations were tolerated for years. Nevertheless, the real beginning of the formation of the HOS (Croatian Defense Force) started with the war in Slovenia, to which the Croatian government reacted extremely indifferently. We then sent our volunteers as assistance to the TO of Slovenia. Upon returning, they began to enter areas (Baranja, Gospic, Obrovac) where the first mortar

attacks by the Yugoslav army had begun. We, simply, could no longer tolerate the vacillation of the government, which was doing nothing for defense, so the people were left to themselves. We went around the areas in Croatia that were particularly threatened, people were in a panic, and Mesic and Manolic were signing shameful agreements. Going around Baranja, I realized that it was an act of betrayal and that this betrayal sat in Zagreb.

[BORBA] Literally—betrayal?

[Paraga] Incompetence and betrayal in government affairs are one and the same. Baranja didn't defend itself at all. The Rights Party brought the first mortar and the first snipers, and our men left Baranja last, and that after my demand in the form of an ultimatum that they leave, because they would all die. There wasn't even the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] then, let alone the Croatian Army. And now this same government, Tudjman primarily, declares us, who have done everything we could for Croatian defense, to be a fascist phalanx and KOS members. Tudjman thinks of himself as God's gift to man, a "Roman pope," and probably holds that he's a descendant of the apostles Peter and Paul, and writes epistles. Open the Gospels, and you will see that in a thousand years of history the number of epistles can be counted on the fingers of one hand, but Tudjman writes them every two weeks.

[BORBA] You obviously do not show any understanding of the defense strategy of the government. However, there have been a lot of changes in the Ministry of Defense....

[Paraga] Hey, what changes! Ignoramuses are replacing ignoramuses. None of those people in the Ministry of Defense have any idea about the job that should be done, and don't want to do it either. Dedakovic asked that one of us go to the Ministry of Defense and request 155-mm shells to be sent to him. He simply couldn't believe that they didn't want to send them to him. Our delegate went to minister Susak on 11 or 12 November, and the minister asked him if he was crazy, to which our man replied with the same question. Susak said that it was not his job to send Dedakovic ammunition and didn't send him anything. They simply did not want to send help.

[BORBA] Why wouldn't they want to send help? It just isn't done convincingly?

[Paraga] My belief is that they wrote those territories off, that they are waiting for the "blue helmets" to resolve the matter, and their only obsession is to preserve the halls of government. As you know, they didn't even take care of them either, but foreign countries exist, there are helicopters and airplanes, and when the situation gets critical, they can also "erase." Because of all that this Vukovar indictment has been written, in which there is only part of the truth. It could have been still sharper.

[BORBA] Who wrote that indictment of the Croatian government. Was Dedakovic the author?

[Paraga] I don't want to reveal yet who wrote it, but Dedakovic is certainly not the author. I don't see why it wouldn't have been sent from his office, and I would have sent it from mine. Only the naked truth is in it. Moreover, it is very indicative of how the government has related to Vukovar the whole time, and later to the people of Vukovar, after the Yugo-army conquered it. According to exchanged prisoners, Vukovar residents, the government behaved as if with mangy sheep. Isn't it significant that the Croatian government isn't at all interested in its own representative in Vukovar, Marin Vidic-Bili? I'm afraid that it's not in the government's interest at all for Bili to return to Zagreb, if he's still alive at all. I think that he would be a much more unfavorable witness than Dedakovic.

[BORBA] The HOS has been charged with sinking into war profiteering. Is that true?

[Paraga] My party has not gotten rich on the war, or outside the war, and the charges of profiteering are a fabrication. We have not bought this building, Starcevic's home....

[BORBA] Yes, you took it by force from the artists of Croatia.

[Paraga] The building was bought by the founder of the HSP, Ante Starcevic, and the government recognized us as successors, thus the legal heirs of Starcevic's party, which was forbidden in 1929. Therefore, we took what was ours.

[BORBA] By force!

[Paraga] You have a right to your opinion, but the government did not want to resolve that problem. A legal government is not in effect in Croatia, so what else was left to us?

Better That They Don't Go to the Elections

[Borba] You say that the HSP is not a war profiteer. Who are the profiteers then?

[Paraga] The profiteers are those who sit deep in the easy chairs of the government today, they have filled their foreign exchange books in foreign banks. The people gave all that they could for defense—both money and gold. Do you remember that Mesic said: "In 24 hours we'll all be on our feet," and Tudjman repeats it like a parrot. The war began, and Croatia was unprepared. Suddenly, there are no weapons, there is no money. And our party collected part of the funds. We have all the accounts and confirmations and we will place everything before the eyes of the public, because we have nothing to hide. It would be good for the government to do this too, but—it doesn't want to. When Bobetko and Mejovsek, assembly representatives, said that there was stealing at the highest levels of the Croatian government, they had to obtain pistols from that moment.

[BORBA] Mejovsek was promoted to counselor in the ministry of defense.

[Paraga] He was promoted to keep silent. A third-rate actor became a "factor" in defense. But, even that's not strange, because all of them in that ministry are—clowns. When the war is over it's better for the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] not to show up at the elections, because at least then the truth will have to come to light.

[BORBA] Will you explain what the goals of your party really are, since they are interpreted in public as very extremist, and even expansionist.

[Paraga] Our goal is the creation of an independent Croatian state for all its citizens and the unification of all Croatian areas.

[BORBA] Isn't that identical with Milosevic's credo about all Serbs in one state?

[Paraga] No, that's not the same. We view matters exclusively from the standpoint of whether the sovereignty of the Croatian state exists and whether that state protects the civil, human, and national rights of all its citizens.

[BORBA] But you extend sovereignty to the Drina, and to the Sandzak, as if Bosnia-Hercegovina does not exist with its borders, and each attempt to change borders, as Croatia was also convinced, means war.

[Paraga] Croatia was wrongly set up from the beginning and the causes of the current war date back to 1918, and the Balkan wars too. Unresolved relations between peoples destroyed Yugoslavia. For 130 years, my party has supported—an integral Croatian state. From Sutla to the Drina. As realistic people, we respect differences among nations, religions, and traditions, and when we speak about Croatian sovereignty in the territory cited, then that means equal rights for all and equal guarantees. That would be the answer to the conflicts and to the constant danger that, because of inequality, the Balkan powder keg always explodes anew.

[BORBA] Do you think that Croatian pretensions to the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina would pass without blood and war. Why would a Croatian state, instead of Bosnia-Hercegovina, be more suitable for the Muslims?

[Paraga] I set out for you our viewpoints, whose starting point is in the Croatian national right, and which presupposes freedom for all peoples. I am aware that Bosnia-Hercegovina is a fact, but the fact is also that its integrity is threatened by Belgrade and that is nothing new. Ever since Garasanin, Serbia has not hidden its pretensions to the territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina, to say nothing about how it, because of such ambitions, began the first world war on Bosnian soil. I passed through areas of eastern Bosnia-Hercegovina and became convinced that among the non-Serbian population there exists a justifiable fear of persecution, killing, and genocide—this has already happened in history—and that these people realize that a coalition of Croats and Muslims is the only effective answer to the greater Serbian appetites and the tragedy that has unfolded. If Serbia had a neutral stand toward Bosnia-Hercegovina, leaving it to its citizens to organize it the way they want, the answer of my party would certainly be different than it is today. Then we would not have the need to display concern, especially for Croats, but also for the other non-Serbian peoples in the area of Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, in the past six months, the question of Bosnia-Hercegovina has been treated as an internal question of greater Serbia, or little Yugoslavia, and my party cannot remain indifferent to that.

Bosnia is considered in Belgrade to be a Serbian province and we do not see any signals that would indicate otherwise. If there were such indications and if the pretensions stopped, we would always be prepared, as a democratic party, for dialogue. We are striving for peace, equality, democracy. But, unfortunately, there is no democracy, not even in Croatia which has held multiparty elections. While it is so, freedom of the press will be extinguished, they will arrest me again, and the BORBA reporters in Zagreb will not have their correspondents office returned to them.

[Box, p 14]

I Don't Want To Play Seselj

The Croatian Rights Party inherits the legacy of the HSP, founded in the last century and banned by the dictatorship of 6 January 1929. Pavelic was the last secretary of the party and a national representative. That is a historical fact that we do not deny and thus we will not erase the face on the group portrait of people from Croatian history. In the emigration of 1929, Pavelic led the Ustashi movement and remained at its head until May 1945. Our party does not identify with this other period of his life. As far as 10 April is concerned, the date of the establishment of the NDH [Independent State of Croatia], we relate to it as the historical date of the Croatian people which is the basis of their independent state. However, we have nothing in common with and distance ourselves completely from the totalitarian regime that was established in that state, its racial laws, discrimination, persecution of the population, and reign of terror.

The current Croatian government seems to us to be identical in its tendencies to the Ustashi movement, and the alleged proof is its insignia "U," which individual members of the HOS, as well as the National Guard, wear. The HSP did not order them to wear that sign, nor does it have anything in common with that designation. Anyone who wears it does so of his own will and, as far as the party is concerned, can remove it. However, we are retaining the greeting "Prepared for the Homeland," because it is older than both the Ustashi movement and the NDH.

Tudjman's regime is trying hard to push our party into an Ustashi context, and to attribute to me a role of the Croatian Seselj. We do not belong in that framework, nor

do I have anything in common with Seselj. Moreover, he is an ancillary (servant) of Slobodan Milosevic, is a guest on Belgrade television when he remembers, while I am Tudjman's sharpest critic and therefore cannot appear on HTV [Croatian Television], and I had to be arrested for my vice president, Ante Dzapic, to get a chance to appear for a few minutes on the screen.

Macedonia

Denko Urges Turkey To Recognize Macedonia

LD2701125192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1209 GMT 27 Jan 92

[Text] Ankara, Jan 27 (TANJUG)—Macedonian Foreign Minister Denko Malevski has urged Turkey to recognize Macedonia's independence.

In an interview published in the Turkish daily MILLIYET today, Malevski said that Turkey's positive step towards the recognition of Macedonia would mean the establishment of stability in the Balkans, to which also an independent Macedonia would contribute.

Malevski accused Greece of exerting pressure on the European Community. "We wanted to resolve the disputes through a dialogue, but the talks did not resume. This is not Macedonia's fault. For the talks to be resumed Greece has demanded that Macedonia's name is changed, which is an infeasible condition," Malevski said.

Macedonia is one of the four Yugoslav republics which have applied for recognition to the EC, but has been recognized only by neighbouring Bulgaria.

After a visit to Turkey by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Turkey decided to postpone the recognition of the Yugoslav republics, until the outcome of the Belgrade initiative for the creation of a "third Yugoslavia" is seen.

Turkey earlier announced it would recognize the four Yugoslav republics in early February.

Program of Republican Party of Macedonia

92BA0355A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 20 Dec 91 p 7

[Text]

New Party on the Macedonian Political Map

Republican Party of Macedonia

Party Program

Preamble

The Republican Party of Macedonia is the continuation of the original Movement for the Liberation and Unification of Macedonia (DOOM) that began to spread the Ilinden idea in 1972. Active involvement in political life in the Republic of Macedonia is our duty to the fatherland, which, by the end of the 20th century, is on the eve of implementing its historical opportunity to become a sovereign state.

Europe is once again redrawing its political map. The countries of the Eastern bloc, which, under the mantle of communism, had been reduced to a status of "limited sovereignty" by the USSR, are returning to it. The breakdown of the Soviet empire also marked the end of the Soviet Union itself, which has split into several independent states or confederated unions. Meanwhile, with its acceptance of human rights and the Common Market as sacred principles, Western Europe is becoming integrated within a political union, despite the national rebellions of the Basques, the Irish, and the Bretons....

The end of the century also marks the breakdown of the SFRY. This offers a great opportunity for the Macedonian people to attain their aspiration of becoming an independent state. The Republican Party of Macedonia favors the creation of a free, independent, wealthy, and democratic Macedonian state that no one would have any reason, be it political or economic, to flee. On the contrary, we shall provide in Macedonia a space in which all of us will have equal opportunities for self-realization.

Yugoslavia

Within its own ethnic territory, the Macedonian people within the SFRY laid the foundations of their own statehood. Bearing in mind the numerous extant economic and cultural ties, the Republican Party of Macedonia does not favor a total break of relations with the other Yugoslav states. The creation of a Yugoslav market within which the subjects of the former SFRY will function is in the common interest.

The Republican Party believes that Macedonia should not deny its share of the Yugoslav debt. At the same time, however, it will not allow any division of federal assets without its participation. Such division must be made honestly, thus not becoming a reason for new confrontations.

The Republic of Macedonia

One year's experience as a pluralist society has proved that, in itself, a multiparty system does not lead to a developed society. This becomes even truer under a government that, in its first 10 months in office, did not undertake to solve the most explosive problem—the restructuring of public property. The basic framework for a market economy has not been created. At the same time, because of increased taxation and inflation, the people are becoming steadily poorer, while the government is asking the Assembly to give it carte blanche in spending state treasury funds.

Although so far it has given no indication of its intention to promote the democratic development of Macedonian

society, under the pretext that "the circumstances are exceptional," the government is aspiring to play a command role. Believing that such a government intends to transform the former communist ideological dictatorship into unlimited power for itself, while the Assembly, in its present structure, is unable to prevent this, the Republican Party of Macedonia calls for new Assembly elections.

Unless we acquire a democratic market-oriented government quickly, through democratic elections, we shall be witnessing an insufferable mockery with peace in Macedonia. The present rulers obviously view peace as the objective, rather than the prerequisite, for any kind of sensible policy.

Foreign Policy

The Republican Party of Macedonia calls for a political consensus regarding Macedonian state interests, based on the following principles:

1. Protection of and respect for human rights of Macedonians in neighboring countries.

2. Equal closeness with all neighboring countries. (Favoring any one of them individually could once again make us lose our state and national independence.)

3. Creation of prerequisites for a confederation of Balkan states as a way of benefiting from the consequences of the separation of Macedonian ethnic territory.

4. Inclusion in the European integration processes.

5. Working for the recognition of the autonomy of the Sveti Kliment Macedonian Orthodox Church.

6. Making the recognition of the Macedonian state the duty of all Macedonians and citizens of Macedonia, wherever they may be.

A Believable State

The Republican Party of Macedonia believes that all reforms in Macedonia are doomed to failure unless the administration of the state becomes efficient.

We need an efficient state that is not expensive to govern and that will regulate general market conditions in order to provide a stable framework for economic management in an atmosphere of free competition among economic subjects.

We need a state that will not consider anyone in Macedonia supernumerary. Along with the development of a stimulating tax system, the social security of all citizens must be ensured. A state that is unable to achieve this and that, conversely, ignores the citizens who are unable to secure their own bare-minimum existence through no fault of their own will rapidly set its citizens against it.

The state must act as the mainstay and guarantor of the citizens. It is created by them and for them. Nepotism, "connections," and bribery...must be remembered as the symbols of communist state officials. Otherwise, once again, the people will have a state they mistrust and will look for ways to harm it in any way that they can. The relationship between the state and the citizens will be reduced to mutual antagonism and trickery. We have already experienced this, we have already felt it, and we know where it could take us.

We need a state whose officials have realized that the rights and freedoms of the citizens do not depend on their goodwill or who believe that these are gifts they are presenting to the citizens. Conversely, the state authorities must protect and strengthen the rights and freedoms of the citizens at all times.

Domestic Defense

In the division of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Macedonia must obtain its share of the Yugoslav National Army as a basis for the development of its own defense system.

The Republic of Macedonia must organize relations of mutual trust with its neighbors and support the initiative of demilitarizing the Balkans as the only protection from the danger of mutual destruction, should the policy of rearmament prevail.

The Republic of Macedonia will be able to trust its own efficient defense by becoming a modern, wealthy, and democratic state that provides and ensures equal opportunities to all of its citizens.

International Relations

The conditions currently prevailing in the area of international relations does not lead to optimism. The Republican Party of Macedonia favors the creation of an atmosphere in which no single non-Macedonian ethnic group within Macedonia will feel oppressed. Hence, it must be wide open to all, regardless of ethnic origins or religious beliefs. In our view, a view of reality according to which there would be no winners in any eventual interethnic clash but only collective losers is the basis for encouraging cohabitation.

The Future Belongs to the Young

Our people are prepared to sacrifice everything for their children. However, what they have today is very little. The youth rebellion against society is turned first of all against the family. So that the day may not come when a child raises his hand against his parents, we demand that radical reforms that would provide opportunities for the young and that would stimulate young people to work, study, create, and find the meaning of their own lives be undertaken as soon as possible.... The young people must feel that in Macedonia they have an opportunity, an honest way of having a high-standard, decent life and not have to share the same roof with their parents until they turn 30. A variety of advantages in the prices of services to the young would make them feel that that state cares

for them. Otherwise, we shall perish quite naturally. What kind of person would want his child to experience such a sense of depression?

The Features of the Party

In terms of its internal relations and organizational principles, the Republican Party of Macedonia is a democratic and pluralistically minded party. Its guideline in its united activities is the democratic transformation of Macedonian society, which, together with radical changes in all areas, will live and work in accordance with contemporary European standards.

The Republican Party of Macedonia finds its support among all citizens of Macedonia who feel that we are on the threshold of a new time, a time that could restore to Macedonia and the Macedonian people their shaken dignity.

Initiative Committee of the Republican Party of Macedonia

1. Ivan Samoliov Petreski-Dzho
2. Dimitar Ivanovski
3. Lyube Ilievski
4. Kiril Radeski
5. Dushan Petreski
6. Suzana Petkovska
7. Gradimir Shumkovski
8. Mile Samoilov-Petreski
9. Mile Pepovski
10. Zlata Isaeska
11. Lazar Ristevski
12. Zoran Bojadzhiev
13. Nevenka Gyorgieva
14. Panche Krstevski
15. Stamat Novkovski
16. Blagoja Pajtalovski
17. Vasko Lyorovski
18. Marjan Marjanovski
19. Igor Korunovski
20. Vlado Blazhevski
21. Blagitsa Trpkova
22. Lyubo Dimovski
23. Slavcho Petreski
24. Nikola Pepovski
25. Rado Trajkovski
26. Lyubcho Trpkovski
27. Pero Kotsevski
28. Slobodan Bubanovski
29. Dimko Nechevski, Denmark
30. Lyubo Ivanovski, Belgium
31. Bruno Kotevski, Denmark
32. Dimitar Tsvetkovski, Australia
33. Lyubisav Filkovski, United States
34. Sotir Pastenarov, France
35. Alekso Dobrshlioski, Germany
36. Dimitrija Talampukovski, Switzerland
37. Kosta Stanoev, Canada
38. Dimche Trajkovski, France
39. Khasani Rode, Canada
40. Todor Kotsevski, Sweden

Albanian Position on Macedonian Constitution

92BA0377B Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 4 Jan 92 p 12

[Article by Iljaz Halimi, chairman of the National Democratic Party: "The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia and the Status of the Albanians"]

[Text] The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia was adopted without the votes of the Albanian representatives but with their physical presence and active participation in the development of the regular steps leading to the adoption of the Constitution.

The preamble, as part of the Constitution, is an expression of the Macedonian national character and declares "the historical fact that Macedonia is the national state of the Macedonian people." The preamble also contains untruths: It stipulates that, starting with the "freely expressed will of the citizens of Macedonia at the 8 September 1991 referendum," it is considered a relevant and constituent fact in structuring the sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia.

It is a well-known fact that the Albanian people in Macedonia boycotted the referendum. The will expressed by the citizens remained insufficient and incomplete for the 40 percent of those with the right to vote. The Albanian people in Macedonia did not express their views on the political and legal consequences that stemmed from the unfree and undemocratic elections.

One of the purposes of drafting that Constitution, as stipulated in the preamble, is the proclamation of national equality. This objective is nothing but a declaration in the preamble and is not sanctioned in the legal part of the Constitution.

On the basis of Article 2 of the Constitution, the citizens are the holders of sovereignty. This constitutional provision minimizes the affirmation and implementation of the national collective rights of the Albanian people in Macedonia. Article 2 is adapted to serving the interests of the Macedonians, who, also at the expense of the Albanian people, during the past 45 years, were able to achieve an enviable degree of institutional national cohesion in all areas of life.

According to Article 2, the Albanians in Macedonia are citizens of the Macedonian national state. Within that state, the Albanian national problem, from the aspect of law, becomes irrelevant.

Up to Article 7 of the Constitution, the adjective "Civil Constitution" is based on the formal and legal equality of the citizens. Starting with Article 7, the national nature of the "Civil Constitution" begins to be unmasked. At this point, national discrimination begins,

above all in language. The citizens in this "Civil Constitution" are considered unequal in terms of language. According to Paragraph 1 of Article 7, the official language in the Republic of Macedonia is Macedonian, written in the Cyrillic alphabet. The Albanian people and their alphabet are not named in the new Constitution. The Albanian language and its alphabet are noted as part of the languages and alphabets of minorities, in the full meaning of the term. The text of Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 is not specific. These are not specific legal stipulations, which makes manipulation in the making of laws possible. In accordance with that article, the Macedonian language and alphabet become dominant and act as the policeman blocking any eventual official use of the language and alphabet of an ethnic group. The language and the alphabet of the ethnic groups will always be used as an addition to the Macedonian language and alphabet.

Nor does domination tolerate linguistic equality. The consequence, in the immediate future, of the stipulations of Article 7 will be the depreciation and subordination of the rich and beautiful Albanian language. The initial symptoms are already clear, as seen in the Constitution.

It is no accident that Article 8 does not include a new paragraph that would list among the basic values of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia that of national equality. This stipulation was suggested by the Albanian people in the public debate on the draft Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. This was the basis for approving and founding a law-governed state in the territory known as Macedonia. The fact that this stipulation was not included makes national advantages and discriminations possible, always in favor of the Macedonians. It also provides grounds for a short life for this Constitution.

Article 44, Paragraph 1 stipulates that everyone has the right to education and schooling. Paragraph 2 stipulates that education is accessible to all. The text is vague. Education yes, but in what language, in what type of institutions, and to what degree of schooling? The text does not regulate the actual relations in Macedonian territory in the area of education. The Albanians will have to develop a scientific, institutional foundation for their full education in Macedonia. The Albanians in Macedonia will not be able to assert their national identity and national characteristics through the schools, university departments, or the Macedonian Academy of Sciences, or with the help of Macedonian educators and respected professors. We sought an answer to this matter in the constitutional provision, which called for equal treatment in education in the Republic of Macedonia for Albanians, along with other groups. As to cadres, Albanians in the Balkans have a full complement of personnel for all degrees of schooling and for the entire Albanian population.

Article 48 establishes a "constitutional ghetto" for anyone living in Macedonia other than the Macedonians. This includes the Albanians. The article deals strictly with ethnic groups. Paragraph 1 guarantees to the individual ethnic groups free speech and care for and development of their identity and national features, but in a very general manner. It seems to emphasize the free expression of the national identity of the Albanians. Bearing in mind the level of civilized emancipation in the times in which we live and under its influence, the Albanians in Macedonia must express their national identity, above all, through the national flag as an expression of Albanian sovereignty in the Republic of Macedonia. Paragraph 3 introduces a constitutional limitation applicable to the ethnic groups and the Albanians: The ethnic groups have the right to found cultural and artistic institutions and scientific associations. How ironic that is. With the word "institution" placed alongside the words "cultural and artistic," the drafters of the Constitution determine how to work for the development of scientific institutions, whereas actually it is a question of developing cultural and artistic associations that are established and financed privately by the citizens, while the part dealing with scientific institutions describes them as scientific and other associations. The absurdity is that we are encouraged to found scientific associations that would ensure the scientific training of the Albanian people in Macedonia. Science without higher schools and scientific institutions and, in our circumstances, the support of the state cannot be developed and cultivated. Scientific institutions are founded after a nation has gone to school and has trained scientists in all fields of science. Paragraph 4 of Article 48 imposes restrictions and divisions based on South African ideology. Training in the schools for Albanians in their native language is limited to secondary education. However, even that right is left to the mercy of the legislator, who has never been merciful when it came to Albanians. Once again, this paragraph emphasizes the predominance of the Macedonian language. The Constitution stipulates that the ethnic groups must also study the Macedonian language.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 48 conflict with Article 45, which stipulates that citizens have the right to found private schools on all educational levels other than at the primary level. Does this mean that, in the near future, by virtue of a special law, the Macedonian state will require that education in a private school or university department be provided in the Macedonian language, or that the Macedonian language, as well, must be studied?

If the Albanians in Macedonia account for 40 percent of the creation of the national income, the Albanians in Macedonia should also have proportional access to the benefits that are the product of their national contribution.

In terms of its leadership, Macedonia has chosen a certain path for the forming of a sovereign and independent state that has no future, a path of unequal development, segregation, subordination of ethnic groups that are not Macedonian, and of aggrandizing the Macedonian people at the expense of the other ethnic groups

living in Macedonia. All of these irregularities are ratified in the new Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. This Constitution puts Macedonia far behind Europe.

Macedonian Albanians Rights Guarantees Reviewed

92BA0387A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jan 92 p 29

[Unattributed article: "What the Albanians Hold Against Gligorov"]

[Text] During the election campaign for president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov said in an anniversary speech that he felt himself to be the president of all citizens of Macedonia and that everything he did would be in the interest of all, regardless of nationality. In the meantime, a year later, Macedonia, having proclaimed state sovereignty verified in a plebiscite, has joined the line of those waiting for international recognition. To be sure, not so decisively as Slovenia and Croatia, but nevertheless much more determinedly and loudly than Bosnia-Hercegovina.

But the Brussels principles on recognition of new states also include the principle of guaranteed rights of ethnic minorities, and looked at through that prism, this multinational republic, with 423,000 Albanians, could not join the company of Croatia and Slovenia when they are recognized as independent states in the near future, unless "something" else crops up. That is, positive Macedonian laws say not a word about the status of Albanians in Macedonia. There are also many Macedonians who favor maintaining the status quo until they see how Croatia fares with the law on minorities.

Macedonian Albanians have nothing of what Croatia is guaranteeing the Serbs in its law. They attend schools whose instruction is in the Macedonian language, on television they only have one daily period of 20 minutes, and there are hardly any enterprises, health care institutions, or public institutions headed by Albanians. Of the 72 hours of history taught annually during the four years of elementary education, only six hours are devoted to the national history of the Albanians. In music classes, again in the four years of elementary school, not a single Albanian folk song is taught. Half of them are Macedonian and half are translated from Macedonian into Albanian. Nothing that is native Albanian! Even in the completely homogeneous ethnic communities, or those where the Albanian population is in the majority, for example, in Tetovo, where Albanians constitute 82 percent of the population and where a large number of school classes are entirely Albanian and with an Albanian instructor, the subject matter must be taught in Macedonian.

Teachers who have used their native language in ethnically homogeneous classes have been fired. In Tetovo Opcina alone, 37 teachers (Prof. Liman Kurtishi, Prof. Shukri Qamili, Prof. Rexhep Saliu, and so on) have lost their jobs for this reason. In language and literature, only 35 percent of the literature is Albanian, and the percentage of Albanian folk poets whose poems are represented in the syllabus is negligible. Instead, they study and read the works of Sinan Hasani and Ali Shukrija! Place names are given only in Macedonian. In 1989, because of the boycott and protest against syllabi like this, 10 pupils in the secondary agricultural school in Tetovo were sentenced to 36 years in prison. Six were under age 18.... Because of the demands for reform of the schools and proportional personnel and political representation, the Macedonians are pushing the Albanians in the direction of separatism and secessionism. Many acute issues are being tabled, many things are being evaded.

The Albanians, a sizable portion of whom voted for Gligorov, resent his failure to become involved in resolving the Albanian question in Macedonia. Albanians are continually being jailed for the verbal crime, while at the same time Macedonians are seeking a "pure" Macedonia in many meetings, telling Albanians to leave for the "other side of Prokletija," calling for "cleavers for the Skipetars," and the like.

Mahmut Jusufi, lawyer and member of the Human Rights Committee, says that the Albanians in Macedonia are given 60 days in prison if they mention "Kosovo a republic"! In the time of the Communists, the Albanians could still display their national symbols to some extent, but now even that has been abolished, Jusufi says. Here, then, not much has changed, and if it has, then it is for the worst, Jusufi adds. The Albanians are fined and jailed because they read a poem at some meeting or because they hang on the wall the calendar of an Albanian party in Macedonia that has been banned. I personally have a great respect for Gligorov, but until he understands that Albanians represent more than 30 percent of the Macedonian population and until he begins to act in keeping with the interests of our people in Macedonia as well, it will not be good either for Macedonians or Albanians, Jusufi concludes.

For the moment, Gligorov is not doing anything, nor is he commenting on the criticism he is receiving from Albanian intellectuals and the two Albanian political parties in Macedonia. Smiling and optimistic, he is bringing his country closer to Europe, skillfully sidestepping conflicts with neighbors, just like the checkpoints manned by strict European arbiters, before whom nevertheless—sooner or later—he will have to admit that Macedonia does not even come close to fulfilling the international conditions for recognition of new states.

Turkish Minority Status in Macedonia Viewed

92BA0377C Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 4 Jan 92 p 15

[Interview with Avni Engyullu, chairman of the Turkish Democratic Alliance, DST, by Panta Dzhambaski in Skopje; date not given: "We Shall Remain a Factor of Stability"]

[Text] We consider Macedonian sovereignty and the civil constitutional status systems within which ethnic elements are protected as part of the common right. The Turks were thrown off the political stage. There have been achievements in the area of equality, but there have also been problems. Turkey will be the first to recognize Macedonia.

Avni Engyullu, chairman of the Turkish Democratic Alliance [DST], is a journalist by profession. For more than 20 years, he has worked in the Turkish section of Macedonian Radio, where he is at present manager of the cultural section. Engyullu is a writer and has published several books of stories and songs. He is a member of the Macedonian Society of Writers. He is one of the founders of the DST, where he worked as secretary and to which he was elected chairman several months ago at its annual assembly. He is currently very active in the union's activities, demanding the resolution of some problems, above all those dealing with the education of the Turks. We held the interview at the Tefejuz primary school in Skopje, where the DST held a meeting at which its programmatic declaration was presented concerning the proclamation of Macedonia as a sovereign state and in which the DST calls for a civil state in which priority will be given to human rights and freedoms. The Turks are citizens of Macedonia but also of Europe, the declaration stated. We discussed the problems of the Turkish minority in Macedonia and the possibility of developing friendly relations between Macedonia and Turkey, in which the Turks who live in Macedonia would form a bridge.

[Dzhambazoski] The Turkish minority in Macedonia did not found a political party but a type of political association, the DST, which, nonetheless, has also functioned at times as a political party. The DST was the first in the Republic to call upon a national minority (the Turks) to vote in favor of a referendum in favor of a sovereign and independent Macedonia. Why?

[Engyullu] Actually, we Turks have always been in touch with our native land, for which reason we have a very clear idea of the nature of pluralism. We knowingly supported the conversion to a pluralistic system. Normally, any individual should be able to express his own political convictions. We, too, the founders of the DST, believe that the rights of the members of that ethnic community to be members of parties that may have different political orientations should not be restricted. However, at the same time, we are convinced that the problems of the Turks should be dealt with in an organized fashion, which would take their decisions into consideration. That is why we organized ourselves as a political association of citizens, which lets our members support a variety of political parties. Yet the political structure in Macedonia has begun to develop differently, which is why we were forced to behave as a political party also. More specifically, we demand that we participate actively in all developments and activities in Macedonia. The fact that we, as you said, were the first to ask the Turks to vote at the referendum in favor of a sovereign Macedonia stems, above all, from our program. From its very beginning, the DST was in favor of sovereignty and the need to proclaim it.

A Constructive Element in Macedonia

[Dzhambazoski] In the course of the history of the Macedonian state, the Turks have always acted as its constituent element but also as a powerful constructive factor. This can be seen today, as well, in all the activities of this young democracy. In short, there are no problems with the Turks. However, perhaps precisely for this reason, it is being said that they do not speak loud enough, which, according to some "spokesmen," could have a detrimental effect on national identity.

[Engyullu] It is true that we are a constituent element of the Republic of Macedonia and fully conscious of this fact. We must point out that the Turks have always been and will remain a factor of stability in this area. Regretfully, because of the attitude of some parties and even of state governmental factors, we were not given the opportunity to also contribute to the stabilization of political tension in our country. This was due strictly to the passing of improper and incorrect laws, even deliberately aimed at excluding us from the political stage in our Republic.

I cannot agree with the statement that we did not speak out. To us, democracy can have but one meaning. The fact that some circles in our country adopted a non-European interpretation of the word "democracy" is a different matter. The fact that some people do not conceive of or understand democracy the way we do should not be interpreted to mean that the Turks did not "speak out." We spoke out but only within the limits of the true meaning of democracy. We remain vocal, and it is only those who should be aware of the new developments brought about by our time and democracy who remain deaf to the vital problems of the Turks.

[Dzhambazoski] Would you agree with the view that the emigres who are most loyal to Macedonia are in Turkey? At the same time, those emigres are politically neutral, although they include many individuals who are today quite noted and influential Turkish citizens. How do you interpret this?

[Engyullu] You are absolutely right when you say that the most loyal emigres are our emigres in Turkey. They remain aware but only about their environment. Yet, when it becomes a question of their native land, they share the feeling that is always that of helping their native land. The reason is, above all, that the Turks as a nation are traditionally very closely attached to their native land. Aware of the presence of the Turkish element here and proceeding from the truth that the Turks did not leave Macedonia of their own free will, it is normal for such an attachment to become even greater.

[Dzhambazoski] Although the Turkish minority in Macedonia is small, considering the millions of Turks

who live in the USSR, Bulgaria, Greece, and other countries, Turkey is displaying a particular interest in them.

[Engyullu] Turkey has always shown an interest in the offspring of its people. It is normal, when it is a question of the Republic of Macedonia, to recall the contribution of the Turkish people, who, through their presence in this area, continue to survive as a national unit. The way we view its interest is quite different....

Turkey shows great respect for relations among ethnic groups that exist in Macedonia, with a view to the countries that surround us. It knows that in our country these relations have been positively resolved but not entirely. This has led to the development of a constructive dialogue between Macedonia and Turkey, which, in some aspects, is interpreted strictly as an interest in Turks living in Macedonia. Actually, it should be considered strictly as an interest in cooperating with Macedonia where we form a bridge for such dialogue and for expanding relations between the two republics.

Turkey Does Not Allow Another Dubrovnik in Macedonia

[Dzhambazoski] According to official data, some 100,000 Turks live in Macedonia. Nonetheless, the Turks have never exhibited a small-ethnic-group complex, unlike other, larger minorities.

[Engyullu] Regardless of their number, in a certain environment outside their native land, the Turks have never felt separated from their native people and native culture. You will agree that their exceptionally rich culture was not created overnight. Such a culture is the pride of every Turk. That is precisely why a nation proud of the culture of its native people can never experience the feeling of being a small nation. Frequent mention is being made also of the number of Turks living throughout the world. However, numbers do not play a major role in the development of a culture. Small nations as well can have great cultural wealth. Actually, the size of its culture is determined by the extent to which that culture has become incorporated in the world.

[Dzhambazoski] Recently, the DST issued a programmatic declaration in which it unequivocally supported the development of Macedonia as a civil state in which priority will be given to human rights and freedoms. Could this trigger a certain apprehension on the part of some members of the DST that this could also result in a gradual loss of national identity?

[Engyullu] None whatsoever. No single civil constitution calls for blocking the national development of groups within a social community. If a constitution tries to do so, such a constitution cannot not be considered a civil constitution. A civil constitution must stipulate the equality of everyone in the eyes of the law. In that case, the preservation of national identity is left exclusively to the citizen himself, who belongs to a certain ethnic group.

Contemporary constitutions, which are based on the enrichment of the rights of the citizens, should provide the grounds for promoting the features of national groups living in the same community. That is precisely why the Constitution that we jointly adopted will be grounds for the rule of civil rights, which will also enrich the national element of each ethnic group.

[Dzhambazoski] Turkey has always maintained a policy of friendly relations with Yugoslavia and Macedonia. What is your view? Will Turkey now be the first state to recognize the Republic of Macedonia?

[Engyullu] On the basis of what we know and the results of our contact with our land or origin, I can confidently say that Turkey will be the first country to recognize Macedonia. I will say something else, as well: One should not forget that here Turkey left behind tremendous historical wealth. There were periods during which efforts were made to uproot the traces of that wealth. Nonetheless, the cultural legacy, which went beyond the borders where it was created, remained alive. Turgut Ozal, the Turkish president, said clearly in a speech that "Turkey will not allow a repetition of what occurred in Dubrovnik and Bosnia-Hercegovina!" Turkey is interested in its cultural wealth, which we own jointly. Another reason for its interest is that the number of our people who have resettled in Turkey is not to be underestimated. It is obvious that those people have a certain influence on Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, the most important factor is that the Republic of Turkey bases its foreign policy on the essential thoughts of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the creator of modern Turkey, which call for "peace in the land and peace throughout the world."

Every Step Taken by Macedonia Must Be a Clear One

[Dzhambazoski] How and in what way do you view the development of friendly relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Turkey?

[Engyullu] The development of relations with the Republic of Turkey will depend, above all, on us and on the type of relations we want. That is why every step we take and every word we say must be clear. I believe that some aspects of our relations and our demands are not entirely clear.

When it becomes a question of the development of relations between the two countries, we should know that Turkey will probably demand some guarantees concerning the rights of members of the Turkish ethnic community. That is why the Turkish public should not be given wrong information as to what is happening or not happening here. What kind of relations do we want, considering that in some areas the Turks are deprived of the possibility of studying their native tongue or of being taught in their native tongue, that Turkish language classes in some areas are being closed down and efforts being made to eliminate the language, that hundreds of children of the Turkish community are left with the first four grades of elementary education and no classes can be opened in high or secondary schools, that they cannot enroll in the university departments they are interested in, that their right to active participation in political life

through their representatives in the parliament and the government is curtailed, that the president of the Republic stated that one of the ministers would be a Turk but that this dragged on for such a long time the prime minister finally looked for a deputy minister to fill a specific position.... At this point, we could list many other things that could influence relations with the Republic of Turkey. I would also like to point out that, if the problems pertaining to the Turks are not resolved as soon as possible, the result could be a new flood of resettlement, the consequences of which would be detrimental to both those who would be forced to emigrate and to Macedonia as their homeland.

We know that Macedonia needs not only the moral but also the material assistance provided by Turkey. However, the present situation in Macedonia, which is still part of the SFRY, is not all that enticing for the Turkish businessmen. In turn, especially for those who trace their origins to this country, they are ready to cooperate on the economic level as well. We must agree that the present situation does not provide any guarantee for their investments. The passing of certain laws for cooperation with foreign countries, I believe, would contribute to the development of faster and different types of relations.

[Dzhambazoski] Finally, a different kind of question. On several occasions, the Cultural-Scientific Assembly of Muslim Macedonians has accused the DST of chauvinism and janissary behavior toward the Muslim Macedonians. What is the situation?

[Engyullu] The DST considers the free national expression of the citizens of Macedonia as part of the general human rights and freedoms. Anything else is alien to us. As for the fact that we are accused by some of being "janissaries," "chauvinists," and so on, that is their business and their own view of things. One thing must be made clear and that is that the DST has always been for and will support the interests of those who proclaim themselves Turks. Let it also not be forgotten that the DST was established only last year, whereas Turks have lived in this land for centuries!

Serbia

Commentary Discourages Fear of UN Troops Arrival

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[Commentary by Dragoljub Milanovic, acting chief and responsible editor of the Belgrade Television Information Program —live]

[Text] How can we convince the Serbian population in the Krajinas that the blue helmets will guarantee them absolute security and a peaceful life? How can we convince the Serbs on these territories that the arrival of the UN forces will in no way prejudice the future political solutions that can only be achieved through the negotiations of the interested sides?

These were the basic questions discussed during the visit of Borisav Jovic [SFRY Presidency member from Serbia] to the UN, which has just ended, and in the talks with UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus Ghali, and Cyrus Vance, creator of the UN peace plan.

Firm assurances and guarantees were once again given during these talks that there is no reason for the Serbian nation on these territories to be afraid. On the contrary. Cyrus Vance, the persistent and patient negotiator and mediator, stressed that Serbia's understanding of the UN peace plan is absolutely correct, and that Under Secretary Marrack Goulding, who will arrive in Yugoslavia soon, will hurry to offer this same explanation to Milan Babic [president of the government of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina], Goran Hadzic [president of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem], and to other leading personalities of the Serbian nation on the territories that are to be put under UN protection. Therefore, the UN will guarantee and maintain peace, while the political solutions will be sought at the Brussels conference.

Demonstrating a maximum level of understanding and good intentions, Cyrus Vance, personal envoy of the UN secretary general, not only expressed readiness to personally give all possible guarantees to the Serbian population, but has also agreed that it be proposed that the UN Security Council include in the text of the future resolution a paragraph stressing the need for the protection of the Serbian nation from any danger and especially from genocide.

Is there anything more that Vance could do? Especially since everybody agreed that the peace troops should be deployed in Yugoslavia's crisis zones as soon as possible. This world-acclaimed international diplomat, the founder of the peace plan that will protect the Serbian nation in Krajina, believes that Serbia's policies—the basic guidelines of which Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic outlined in his letter to Milan Babic—have been accepted by the leading UN representatives, which means that the rights and liberties of the Serbs in Krajina are secured at the highest possible international level. A policy cannot get higher acclaim and recognition than Serbia's policy received regarding the resolving of the Yugoslav drama, and especially, concerning the protection of the Serbian nation in Krajina.

Therefore, any future encouragement of defeatism and fear among the people in Krajina, and taking advantage of the lack of information among these people to accomplish a leader's ambitions and selfish interest—like Milan Babic and some opposition forces, who sometimes use war and sometimes peace to try to undermine the legal authorities in Serbia—would be very dangerous and would only lead to new conflicts and divisions instead of concentrating all forces to find a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav drama with the UN's help.